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My dissertation includes two related essays in supply chain and corporate finance. The first is 
sole authored and entitled “Do merger waves cause ripples in vertically related industries” and 
the second is co-authored with Shawn Thomas and entitled “Changes in concentration across 
vertically related industries”. In the first, I use a sample of all industries experiencing merger 
activity between 1980 and 2008 to investigate the relation between customer and supplier 
horizontal merger waves. I find evidence that a merger wave in a customer (supplier) industry 
increases the likelihood of a subsequent merger wave in a related industry by 30% (28%), 
depending on the definition of merger wave used. Additional tests of the data show that industry 
merger waves are more likely to follow customer merger waves, but not necessarily supplier 
merger waves, when bargaining power motives are at work. I find that vertically related industry 
merger waves occur subsequent to supplier and customer industry merger waves, suggesting that 
merger waves move along the supply chain. Finally, I find that the association between related 
industry horizontal merger waves is strongest for non-consumer goods industries and industries 
with little product differentiation.  
In the second essay, we investigate the magnitude, timing, and direction of the 
association between changes in concentration across vertically related industries over the period 
1978-2008.  We find robust evidence that changes in an industry’s level of concentration are 
significantly positively related to prior and simultaneous changes in the concentration of their 
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customer industries. We find weaker evidence that changes in an industry’s level of 
concentration are related to changes in the concentration of their supplier industries.  Thus, the 
association between changes in concentration across vertically related industries appears stronger 
in the upstream direction than in the downstream direction.  We find that increased concentration 
across vertically related industries, perhaps reflecting countervailing power effects, explains in 
part the observed positive association between changes in concentration; however, we also find 
robust evidence that decreases in concentration, perhaps reflecting the effects of technological 
innovation in vertically related industries, are also important determinants of the observed 
association.        
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PREFACE 
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took to complete this work. I would like to thank all of the members of my dissertation 
committee; Oya Altinkilic, Leonce Bargeron, Joseph Fan, and Sara Moeller, for generously 
giving of their time and expertise which greatly improved this work. I would like to thank 
Kenneth Lehn for his encouragement, excellent instruction and inspiration. I would like to thank 
the members of the Katz doctoral office, in particular Carrie Woods, for their assistance and 
optimism. I would like to thank Lindsay Calkins, Jesse Ellis, and Mehmet Yalin for editing, 
programming support, and general feedback. 
Finally, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my family, friends and colleagues who 
have supported me. I thank my many friends for encouragement and belief in my abilities. I 
 xiii 
thank my sisters for prayers and support, especially Emily Myers for offering me a place to stay 
on my many trips to Pittsburgh. I thank my parents-in-law, Toni and Ronald Becker and my 
parents, Antoinette and Thomas Myers for their love, prayers and countless hours of childcare. I 
am especially grateful to my husband Noel and my daughters Mia and Katherine for their 
patience, understanding and love as I pursued this degree. This work was not possible without 
the encouragement and emotional support they freely gave despite the fact that, especially in the 
case of my small children, they could not comprehend the reasons or nature of my work.   
1.0  ESSAY 1: DO MERGER WAVES CAUSE RIPPLES IN VERTICALLY 
RELATED INDUSTRIES? 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A well-established finding in modern corporate finance is that mergers and acquisitions cluster 
by industry and over time (see Gort, 1969 and Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Researchers have 
found that industries experiencing higher merger activity have often experienced shifts in 
regulation, demand, or technology. Moreover, events in one industry may affect, sometimes 
dramatically, industries connected through trade relations. In fact, prior research shows that 
financial distress (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008), market returns (Menzly and Ozbas, 
2010, and Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), and merger activity (Ahern and Harford, 2011 and 
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2010) extend along the supply chain and spread to firms operating in 
customer and supplier industries. The primary purpose of this paper is to test for an association 
of horizontal merger waves in vertically related industries.  
The evidence in this paper suggests that a merger wave in a supplier industry 
significantly increases the likelihood of a subsequent horizontal merger wave in the vertically 
related industry by as much as 28%, depending on the definition of merger wave used. This 
statistically and economically significant finding is robust to a variety of tests. I also find that the 
incidence of a merger wave in a customer industry increases the likelihood of a subsequent 
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merger wave in the vertically related industry by 30% again depending on the definition of 
merger wave used. Testing of the timing of the merger waves shows that supplier merger waves 
precede vertically related industry merger waves and that customer merger waves occur prior to 
and concurrent with vertically related industry merger waves. Thus, horizontal merger waves 
move along the supply chain.  
There are several, although not mutually exclusive, reasons why customer or supplier 
horizontal merger waves may be associated with related industry merger waves. First, firms in 
both industries could be efficiently reacting to a extraneous shock such as technological 
improvements or changes in government regulations. Second, operational considerations may be 
at work in the sense that a merged customer may require that suppliers be able to fulfill larger 
orders, which may encourage subsequent horizontal supplier mergers. Finally, the hypothesis of 
countervailing power offered by Galbraith (1952) suggests that a firm may gain bargaining 
power with customers and/or suppliers by merging horizontally. As a result, trading partners may 
take actions to neutralize this bargaining power gain by engaging in mergers of their own. Thus, 
mergers beget mergers.  
Through subsequent testing of the data I find some evidence to support Galbraith’s theory 
of countervailing power. Specifically, I find that the association between customer industry 
horizontal merger waves and vertically related industry horizontal merger waves is strongest 
when countervailing power motives are most likely to be at work, that is when the customer 
industry is experiencing higher profits or is increasing in concentration. Other tests show that 
industries in a weaker bargaining position otherwise, i.e. those with less differentiated products, 
are more likely to respond to a customer industry merger wave with a merger wave of its own. 
This association is not as strong for supplier industry merger waves. While I find that industries 
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with less differentiated products are likely to follow supplier merger waves with own horizontal 
merger waves, this association does not exist when bargaining power motives are most likely to 
be at work. Thus, there is strong (mixed) evidence that countervailing motives are an important 
determinant of horizontal industry merger waves that follow customer (supplier) merger waves.  
This paper complements two recent papers examining merger activity along the supply 
chain. Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) examine the effects of customer mergers on supplier 
margins and pricing and show that horizontal merger activity (not a merger wave) is associated 
with prior horizontal merger activity in customer industries.1
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents related literature and develops the 
hypothesis. Section 3 provides details about the sample construction, customer and supplier 
relations, and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 provides 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
  Ahern and Harford (2011) use 
networking techniques to show that merger waves (for all merger activity, not just horizontal) are 
related to merger activity in trade-connected industries. This paper extends this analysis and to 
my knowledge is the first comprehensive large sample test of whether horizontal merger waves 
in vertically related industries follow horizontal merger waves in customer and supplier 
industries. In addition, this paper is the first to test which industries are likely to have this 
association and it provides evidence that in the case of customer merger waves, countervailing 
power motives are associated with subsequent horizontal merger waves.  
                                                 
1 Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) test for a relationship between prior supplier industry merger activity and 
subsequent related industry merger activity and find none.  
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1.2 RELEVANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This paper draws upon merger wave and financial supply chain literature. Further, motivation for 
the research question comes from the countervailing power hypothesis explored in the industrial 
organization and corporate finance literature. Thus, merger wave, supply chain and 
countervailing power literature, as well as the hypothesis are discussed below. 
1.2.1 Merger wave literature 
Previous literature has documented that mergers cluster across industries and over time.2  The 
neoclassical theory of merger waves posits firms are simultaneously responding to 
macroeconomic, industrial or competitive shocks using the least-cost method available (Gort, 
1969). Empirical efforts to document specific events leading to merger waves have identified 
industry shocks such as deregulation (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; Harford, 2005; 
Ovtchinnikov, 2010), changes in demand (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), changes in operating 
performance (Harford, 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996), and new technologies (Holstrom and 
Kaplan, 2001) as events precipitating merger waves. Additionally, Harford (2005) shows that 
favorable overall economic conditions, as measured by the ease of corporate lending, are an 
important determinant of industry merger waves.3
                                                 
2 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), and Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
regarding waves in the 1980’s and 1990’s and Alexandridis, Mavrovitis and Travlos (2010) for a description of 
merger activity in the 2000’s. 
 Other merger wave research suggests that 
game theoretic forces (Yan, 2009 and Fridolfsson and Stannek, 2005) or managerial empire 
building (Goel and Thakor, 2010 and Duchin and Schmidt, 2010) are associated with merger 
3 See also Ditmar and Ditmar (2008) which documents that merger waves are related to growth in GDP. 
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waves. This paper contributes to merger wave research by exploring an additional trigger that 
may be associated with merger waves, that of a merger wave in a customer or supplier industry.   
1.2.2 Supply chain literature 
There is a growing body of research linking events in one industry to the competitive, financing, 
and operational environment in another. Related to mergers, Becker and Thomas (2011) find 
evidence that large increases in customer concentration (i.e. consolidation) are associated with 
subsequent large increases in supplier concentration, consistent with the idea that horizontal 
mergers in one industry lead to horizontal mergers in another. Ahern and Harford (2011) use 
networking techniques from graph theory to show that merger waves propagate across industry 
networks over time. Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), in a sample of mining and manufacturing 
firms, find a association between customer merger waves and supplier operating margin and in a 
larger sample, between customer merger activity and subsequent supplier merger activity. 
Additionally, researchers have found evidence that financial distress (Hertzel, Li, Officer and 
Rodgers, 2008), capital structure (Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim, 2008, and Kale and Shahrur, 
2007), and merger gains (Ahern, 2010) may spread along the supply chain. This paper adds to 
previous research and provides further evidence that industries do not exist in isolation and 
decisions made by managers in one industry have effects that extend to vertically related 
industries. 
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1.2.3  Countervailing power literature and hypothesis development 
The idea that customer and supplier merger waves may be associated with vertically related 
industry merger waves stems from the theory of countervailing power first offered by Galbraith 
(1952). When first presented, Galbraith used the term countervailing power to describe the 
ability of large buyers in concentrated markets to gain more favorable pricing from suppliers 
(Snyder, 2005). He extended this notion to include the supposition that merging firms create a 
measure of monopoly (or monopsony) power which buyers (or sellers) are encouraged to 
counteract. Because larger negotiating partners garner more bargaining power, Stigler (1954) 
notes that according to this theory, mergers beget mergers. Although the countervailing power 
hypothesis was originally criticized (Stigler, 1954), recent evidence supports it (Bhattacharyya 
and Nain, 2011).  
Below I explain why merging suppliers may encourage subsequent customer mergers and 
then why the converse may be true. To start, suppliers engage in horizontal mergers for 
efficiency or empire building reasons and subsequently experience higher profits.4 Customers, 
realizing there are larger gains to bargain for, may engage in merger activity of their own to 
obtain better pricing from sellers (see Stigler, 1964).5
                                                 
4 We are agnostic as to why the suppliers are merging and how they subsequently gain higher profits. 
 Snyder’s (1998) model supports this 
conclusion and shows that suppliers engage in more aggressive price competition after customers 
merge. In this scenario, the larger customers simulate a boom in demand and as a result sellers 
are willing to deviate from collusive pricing.  
5 Empirical studies by Lustgarten (1975), Chipty (1995), and Scherer and Ross (1990) also support the idea that 
larger customers enjoy greater bargaining power. 
6 
 
Working in an auction setting, Snyder (1996) also suggests that merging customers may 
obtain better pricing due to intensified supplier competition. In this model, firms engaging in 
horizontal mergers use their purchasing power to induce suppliers to compete in a “winner-take-
all” tournament (see also Fee and Thomas, 2004). In the same vein, Inderst and Shaffer (2007) 
show that, following a merger, retailers (customers) can enhance bargaining power vis-à-vis 
suppliers by committing to a single source purchasing strategy. Thus, following supplier 
mergers, customers are encouraged to engage in mergers themselves to foster price competition 
amongst the remaining suppliers.  
In addition to bargaining power considerations, larger customers may be able to secure 
lower prices from suppliers due to lower distribution or production costs if the production 
function exhibits increasing returns to scale (Snyder, 2005). Taken together, past research 
suggests that supplier merger waves may induce subsequent customer industry merger waves as 
customers grow in order to better bargain with suppliers or to take advantage of production 
efficiencies.  
Past research also suggests that the converse may be true; supplier mergers may follow 
customer mergers. One reason suppliers may merge is to better negotiate with larger customers. 
Horn and Wolinski (1988) show that merged suppliers can gain power vis-à-vis customers 
through more credible bargaining. Bargaining gains in this case come from the material 
commitment that makes any price concession more costly for the merged versus stand alone 
supplier. Suppliers may also merge to take advantage of scale economies provided by larger 
orders from merged customers (Lambrecht, 2004). Lambrecht’s model also shows that the 
takeover premium in hostile deals is increasing in product market uncertainty. Larger customers 
provide more product market uncertainty because the loss of any one customer is costlier, even if 
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the probability that any one customer may leave is unchanged (Snyder, 1998). This greater 
uncertainty leads to higher takeover premiums and increases the likelihood that a supplier 
industry takeover offer will be made and accepted.  
Empirical support that customer mergers may be associated with subsequent supplier 
mergers come from Fee and Thomas (2004) who find that suppliers experience significant 
declines in cash flow margins immediately subsequent to downstream mergers. The margin 
deterioration is not permanent, however, suggesting that suppliers may undertake actions of their 
own to offset customer bargaining gains. Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) find evidence that 
suppliers may engage in acquisitions to off-set any adverse bargaining power effects resulting 
from previous customer merger activity.6
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
   
H0: A horizontal merger wave in a customer or supplier industry increases the 
likelihood of a horizontal merger wave in a vertically related industry.  
There is the possibility, however, that a common shock exogenous to both industries is 
the cause for merger waves occurring subsequently in vertically related industries. In order to 
test if the merger wave association between customer and supplier industries is related to the 
shock of the prior merger wave versus an exogenous shock, I control for other factors previously 
found to be associated with industry merger waves. Further, I examine if the association is 
stronger for industries that are more closely related (see Fee and Thomas, 2004 and Shahrur, 
2005) and in cases where bargaining power motives are more likely to be at work. Finally, I 
examine the timing between the customer or supplier merger wave and the related industry 
merger wave.  
                                                 
6 See also Chipty and Snyder, 1999 and Gal-Or and Dukes, 2006 for additional consideration of merger effects on a 
customer’s bargaining position. 
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1.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To determine whether merger waves in an industry are associated with prior customer or supplier 
merger waves, I use customer and supplier relations drawn from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) input-output (I-O) tables to generate two samples; one where each industry is matched 
with its significant suppliers and the second where each industry is matched with its significant 
customers. The samples are called Industry & Suppliers and Industry & Customers, respectively. 
When discussing the Industry & Suppliers sample I use the term “suppliers” to refer to the 
matched suppliers and “related industries” to refer to the set of industries. The terminology is 
analogous for the Industry & Customers sample. Because there is no clear consensus on what 
constitutes a merger “wave”, I use past research as a guide to generate two definitions of merger 
waves which are used in the empirical analysis. The process of matching industries with 
customers and suppliers and the methodology for identifying merger waves are discussed below.   
1.3.1 Industry classifications and relations 
I classify industries based on the industry codes (IO-codes) used in the 2002 Make and Use 
tables published by the BEA.7
                                                 
7 Using BEA tables from only one year is advisable because BEA updates industry codes with each new set of 
detailed tables. Tables from different time periods are not directly comparable and using multiple tables precludes 
me from creating a panel of data extending more than five years. As a robustness test I perform the same analysis 
using the 1992 BEA tables and find similar if not stronger results. See 
 The Make table details commodities produced and the Use table 
details commodities used as production inputs by each industry. The most important source of 
information for the Make and Use tables is the US Census Bureau’s Economic Census which is 
an establishment-by-establishment survey of businesses operating inside the United States 
1.5.3 Industry relationship tests for a 
discussion of these results. 
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conducted every five years. There are 439 industries and other categories in the Make and Use 
tables.8
Following the methodology outlined in Appendix A, I use the Make and Use tables to 
create an industry by industry production-consumption matrix. Using this matrix I match the 387 
industries with supplier industries providing at least 5% of the industry’s inputs.
 My sample includes the 387 private (non-governmental) industries with at least one 
merger during the entire sample period of 1980-2008.  
9 This is the 
basis for the first sample, which I call the Industry & Suppliers sample. On average, an industry 
has 4.3 related suppliers and purchases 10.5% (median is 8.0%) of its commodity inputs from a 
related supplier.10 In total, I identify 38,852 relationship-years from which I build the Industry & 
Suppliers sample. Additionally, I match each of the 387 industries with customer industries 
consuming at least 3% of the industry’s outputs.11 This is the basis for the second sample, which 
I call the Industry & Customers  sample. On average, an industry has 5.9 related customers and 
sells 9.2% (median is 5.9%) of its commodity outputs to a related customer.12
                                                 
8 Other categories include scrap, imports, exports and government activities. 
 Eighty-five 
9 Statistics for industries and their top 10 suppliers show that the median (mean) percentage of inputs supplied to the 
industry is 5.9% (3.9%). 5% is between these two figures and has been used in prior research (Shahrur, 2005). See 
1.5.3 Industry relationship tests for results where the cut-off is reduced to 3%. 
10 As an example, the industry with the most matched suppliers is the rubber and plastics hoses and belting 
manufacturing industry. The suppliers to the industry and percent of commodities supplied are: other rubber product 
manufacturing (13.0%) knit fabric mills (11.8%), plastics material and resin manufacturing (8.0%), management of 
companies and enterprises (6.6%), wholesale trade (5.7%) other basic organic chemical manufacturing (5.5%), 
synthetic rubber manufacturing (5.5%), and hardware manufacturing (5.2%). 
11 Statistics on industries and their top 10 customers show that median (mean) percentage of inputs supplied to the 
industry is 4.0% (1.9%). 3% is between these two figures and has been used in prior research (Shahrur, 2005). 
Further, household consumption is an important non-industrial customer in the sample. 41% of the industries’ most 
important customer is private households, and on average (the median) private households purchase 30.1% (8.2%) 
of an industry’s output. Consumption by governmental agencies further lowers the percentage of output sold to 
private industry. This explains a lower 3% cut-off in sample 2 versus sample 1. See 1.5.3 Industry relationship tests 
for results where the cut-off is increased to 5%. 
12 As an example, the industry with the most matched customers is the electronic capacitor, resistor, coil, 
transformer, and other inductor manufacturing industry. The customers of this industry and percent of output 
purchased are: software publishing (8.4%) motor vehicle parts manufacturing (6.9%), semiconductor and related 
device manufacturing (6.2%), printed circuit assembly manufacturing (5.6%) electronic computer manufacturing 
(5.2%), bare printed circuit board manufacturing (4.9%), electro medical and electrotherapeutic apparatus 
manufacturing (4.3%), telecommunications (3.7%), search, detection, and navigation instruments manufacturing 
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industries have no industry customers consuming over 3% of its outputs. These industries have a 
majority of the output sold to personal households or to the government.13
1.3.2  Merger data and merger wave definitions 
 In total, I identify 
34,260 relationship-years from which I build the Industry & Customers sample. The similar 
sample sizes and trade relation averages (10.5% percent of inputs supplied and 9.2% percent of 
outputs consumed) indicate that the samples are comparable. 
I collect merger and acquisition data using Security Data Corp.’s (SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions 
database and include all completed horizontal mergers and tender offers of U.S. targets meeting 
the following criteria: (1) the announcement date is between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 
2008, (2) the percent of acquired shares is greater than 50% and (3) the acquirer owns at least 
95% of the target’s shares upon completion of the transaction.14 For each deal I also obtain 
transaction value (where available) which is defined as the total value of the consideration paid 
by the acquirer less fees associated with the deal. Because SDC reports an industry NAICS code 
with each target and acquirer, I use the IO-code to NAICS code translation table published by the 
BEA to assign IO-codes to all companies used in the study.15,16
                                                                                                                                                             
(3.6%), other electronic component manufacturing (3.2%), audio and video equipment manufacturing (3.0%), and 
telephone apparatus manufacturing (3.0%). 
 Mergers are deemed to be 
13 Examples include personal care services; amusement parks, arcades, and gambling industries; offices of 
physicians, dentists, and other health practitioners; retail; ammunition manufacturing; bowling centers; automotive 
repair and maintenance, except car washes; and automobile manufacturing. 
14 Because I do not rely on data available only from publicly traded firms I am able to include many transactions that 
are traditionally dropped from other datasets. See Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2010) for a discussion of how 
data screens on the size and characteristics of transactions in the SDC database can significantly influence results. 
15 SDC uses 2007 NAICS codes for all companies, regardless of the year of the deal. First, therefore, I map the 2007 
NAICS codes to the 2002 NAICS codes.  
16 There are 1,146 different 6-digit NAICS codes that are matched to 439 IO-codes. Some mappings are direct. 
Often, however, two or three NAICS codes are mapped to one IO-code. A typical example is the IO-code 311810, 
bread and bakery product manufacturing, which has three NAICS codes, 311811, retail bakeries, 311812, 
11 
 
horizontal if the two merging entities have the same IO-code. There are 54,349 horizontal 
transactions representing $7.9 trillion in 2008 dollars worth of deals that fit the above 
description. Figure 1 shows the number of horizontal transactions and total transaction value for 
all industries by year. The figure shows a pattern of mergers similar to those examined in other 
studies with aggregate merger wave periods in the late 1980’s, late 1990’s and the middle of the 
first decade of the 2000’s. On an industry basis, there are a total of 387 industries with zero to 
609 horizontal mergers per year.17
Using the transaction data described above, I measure adjusted acquisition activity for 
each IO-code as total annual industry transaction value divided by fiscal year-end market value 
of industry assets.
 On average (median) an industry is involved in 4.7 (0.0) 
mergers per year. Of those industries reporting a deal with a disclosed transaction value in a year, 
the average (median) reported annual transaction value in an industry year is $2,074 million 
($123 million). 
18 I identify a merger wave using two methods. In the first, an industry merger 
wave occurs if the 2-year moving average of adjusted acquisition activity is in the top 20% of the 
sample, there are at least three horizontal mergers in the year, and if neither of the previous two 
years are considered a wave.19
                                                                                                                                                             
commercial bakeries, and 311813, frozen cakes, pies, and other pastries manufacturing mapped to it. In some cases, 
many NAICS codes are mapped to one IO-code. Two examples are the wholesale and retail industries where 71 and 
75 NAICS 6-digit NAICS codes industries are mapped each IO-codes industry, respectively. 
 These restrictions make certain that the acquisition activity is high 
relative to all industries, is not driven by one or two extremely large transactions, and ensures 
17 The monetary authorities and depositary credit intermediation industry in year 1995 accounts for the 609 
transactions in one year. 
18 Market value of assets data is from Compustat and is calculated as the sum of net debt (total of long term debt 
plus capitalized lease obligations less cash), market value of preferred stock and the number of common shares 
outstanding times price per share. 
19 This measure is similar to the measure of liquidity of corporate assets used by Schlingemann, Stultz and Walkling 
(2002). I chose the two year moving average because past merger wave studies treat industry merger waves as a 
two-year phenomena. See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005), Duchin and Schmidt (2008), and Gorton, 
Kahl and Rosen (2009). 
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that I identify the start of the merger wave. There are 557 identified waves using this 
methodology, which I refer to as Top20_Wave.  
For the second measure, merger activity is considered a wave if the one year adjusted 
acquisition activity level is at least one standard deviation above own industry mean measured 
over the sample period. All years which meet this criterion are considered wave years.20
Figure 2
 There 
are 776 waves identified using this methodology which I refer to as STD_Wave.  depicts 
the number of Top20_Waves and STD_Waves by year and shows greater year over year 
variation of STD_Waves as compared to Top20_Waves. I combine merger wave information 
with the industry-customer and industry-supplier relations described above to form the two 
samples. See Table 1 and Table 2 for descriptive statistics on each sample.  Panel A contains 
statistics for the industries and Panel B contains statistics for the related supplier (or customer) 
industry. Because each sample starts with the same set of industries and differ only in the 
matched customer or supplier industries, I expect and find that the statistics in Panel A are 
similar for both samples. Panel B shows that supplier industries are larger and on average 
involved in more transactions (on a dollar basis) than are the customer industries.   
1.3.3 Economy and industry control variables 
Certain economic and industry factors have been found in past empirical research to positively 
affect merger rates over time. One is the ease with which managers can obtain funds to finance 
investment projects. As a proxy I use the spread of the average commercial and industrial loan 
rate over the federal funds rate which Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000) find is highly 
                                                 
20 Measure based on the variable used in a recent working paper by Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang (2010). 
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negatively correlated with ease of commercial lending (see also Harford, 2005, and Maksimovic, 
Phillips, and Yang, 2010). A higher spread implies tighter lending standards and is expected to 
be negatively related to merger wave activity. 
Harford (2005) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that deregulatory events are a 
catalyst for industry merger waves and Andrade et al. (2005) find that over half of the merger 
activity in the 1990s is associated with deregulation. In this study I use a dummy variable to 
indicate an industry has experienced a deregulatory event in year t= 0 and expect that this 
variable is positively related to the likelihood of industry merger waves. I obtain information on 
deregulation from Economic Reports to the President and specific industry sources.21
A negative relation between initial levels of concentration and the likelihood that 
concentration will increase further is documented in the literature (see Curry and George, 1983) 
for a review). In addition, anti-trust policies may make it difficult for a highly concentrated 
industry to consolidate further. Therefore, the industry Herfindahl Index which is the sum of 
squared market shares is included as a control variable.
 
22 In an effort to control for industry 
shocks other than deregulation, I follow Harford (2005) and include a variable to take into 
account several correlated factors that may influence an industry’s decision to consolidate. The 
industry shocks variable is the first principal component of the one year absolute change in 
following variables: profitability, asset turnover, capital expenditures, employee growth, return 
on assets and sales growth.23
                                                 
21 Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2000) contains a list of deregulatory events obtained from an Economic Report 
to the President. Deregulation events are found in the Economic Report to the President for years 1989, 1995, 1999, 
2001, 2003, and 2005. Specific industry sources include www.consumerreports.org and www.naturalgas.org. 
  
22 Industry sales data is from Compustat. 
23 Because principal component analysis is heavily influenced by outliers I Winsorize the variables at the 5% level. 
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If investment opportunities are high and internal growth is time consuming, firms may 
prefer to acquire other firms in the industry rather than rely on organic growth. To capture the 
aggregate level of investment opportunities I follow Maksimovic et al. (2010) and use the one 
year return on the S&P500 as a control variable. If managerial motives are a significant catalyst 
of merger waves, those industries with more cash would be more  likely to engage in merger 
activity. To capture the managerial motive for merger waves I use industry cash divided by 
assets as a control variable (See Jensen, 1986). See Table 3 Panel A for a summary of the above 
discussion.  
1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.4.1 Industry & Suppliers results 
This section examines the likelihood of merger waves in relation to previous supplier industry 
merger waves. In a univariate setting, I find that on average an industry experiences 0.054 
Top20_Waves and 0.079 STD_Waves per year when a matched supplier industry does not 
experience the start of a merger wave two years prior. The averages increase to 0.079 
Top20_Waves and 0.095 STD_Waves per year when the supplier industry does experience the 
start of a merger wave two years prior, increases of 46% and 20%, respectively. The difference 
in means is significant at the 1% level for both merger wave measures.  
To determine whether the univariate results hold after controlling for certain economic 
and industry factors previously found to affect merger rates over time, I estimate several logistic 
regression models. The sample is the Industry & Suppliers supplier sample for years 1980 – 2008 
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and the first and last years of the sample are dropped due to leads and lags in the data. The 
logistic equations are as follows: 
 
Logit(pTop20_Wave=+1) = β0 + β1SupTop20_Wavet=-1 + β2Spreadt=-1,0 + β3Deregulationt=0 + β4Herfindahlt=0 (1) 
+ β5Principal componentt=0+ β4Industry casht=0 +S&P one year returnt=-1,0  
 
Logit(pSTD_Wave=+1) = β0 + β1SupSTD_Wavet=-1 + β2Spreadt=-1,0 + β3Deregulationt=0 + β4Herfindahlt=0 (2) 
+ β5Principal componentt=0+ β4Industry casht=0 +S&P one year returnt=-1,0  
 
 
where Top20_Wavet=+1 (STD_Wavet=+1) is a dummy variable equal to one if the related industry 
experiences a merger wave beginning in year t= +1 and SupTop20_Wavet=-1 (SupSTD_Wavet=-1) 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the related supplier industry experiences a merger wave 
beginning in year t= -1. Panels A and B of Table 3 contain definitions and descriptive statistics, 
respectively, for Spreadt=-1,0, Deregulationt=0, Herfindahlt=0, Principal componentt=0, Industry 
casht=0, and S&P one year returnt=-1,0. The table shows that deregulation is a infrequent event and 
that the industries are, on average, highly concentrated.24
Table 4
 
 presents the results of the logistic regression model estimating merger waves.25
                                                 
24 The Department of Justice considers an industry to be highly concentrated if the Herfindahl is above 0.18. 
  
Columns (1) and (4) contain results for the logistic model including control variables only. 
Columns (2) and (5) contain results including the supplier merger wave variable. As is consistent 
with the hypothesis, the supplier Top20_Wave (column 5) variable is positive and significant at 
the 5% level, indicating that an industry is more likely to undergo a merger wave in year t= +1 if 
a supplier industry has undergone a merger wave beginning in year t= -1. The supplier 
STD_Wave variable is positive but has a p-value of 14%. The odds ratio of 1.31 (1.14) for the 
supplier Top20_Wave (supplier STD_Wave) variable indicates that the odds of an industry 
25 P-values are based on White standard errors clustered at the industry level. 
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experiencing a merger wave beginning in year t= 1 increase by a factor of 1.31 (1.14) if the 
supplier has experienced a merger wave in year t= -1, holding all other variables constant. 
Further, when the Top20_Wave variable changes from 0 to 1 the probability of observing a 
Top20_Wave in an industry increases from 0.044 to 0.057, an increase of 28.0%, holding all 
other variables at their mean. The higher Chi-squared test for model (2) as compared to model 
(1) (114.50 vs. 112.50) and for model (5) as compared to model (4) (74.81 vs. 72.21) indicates 
that the models including supplier merger wave variables improve our ability to explain the 
likelihood of the occurrence of an industry merger wave.  
As is consistent with previous research, the coefficient on the average spread variable is 
negative and significant at the 1% level for all models indicating that an industry is less likely to 
experience a merger wave when spreads are high. The deregulation coefficient has an expected 
positive sign but is not significant in any specification. For all specifications, the coefficient on 
the industry Herfindahl is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that an already 
concentrated industry is less likely to undergo a merger wave.26
                                                 
26 The results are similar when I use the residuals from an OLS equation where the dependent variable is the 
Herfindahl at t=0 and the independent variables are Herfindahl measured at t=-1 and t=-2 as the measure of 
concentration. Results are also similar for a specification including Herfindahl at t=0 and Herfindahl at t=0 squared. 
Results are similar if I include the number and percent of medium sized firms in an industry, where a medium-sized 
firm is defined as one with total assets between 5% and 30% of total assets of the industry’s largest firm (see Gorton 
et al., 2009). 
 Coefficients on principal 
component variables are difficult to interpret. The coefficient on the first principal component is 
positive in the first three specifications and negative in the last three specifications and is never 
significant. Industry cash is positive and significant indicating that those industries with more 
cash as a percentage of assets are likely to engage in a merger wave. Consistent with the idea that 
periods of higher investment opportunities are associated with acquisitions, the S&P one year 
17 
 
return is positively associated with industry merger waves the following year for the 
Top20_Wave variable. This variable is positive but not significant for the STD_Wave measure.27
To test if the relation between industry and supplier merger waves is stronger when the 
supplier is a relatively more important one, I generate a dummy variable equal to one if the 
supplier is the top supplier to the industry as measured by percent of inputs provided. The 
interaction term (supplier wave dummy times top supplier dummy) is positive and jointly 
significant with the supplier Top20_Wave variable at the 5% level in specification (3). This 
suggests that a merger wave in a more versus less important supplier industry increases the 
probability that the related industry will experience a subsequent merger wave. This relation is 
not found in the STD_Wave model. Therefore I find evidence with the Top20_Wave measure 
that the effect a supplier industry merger wave has on the likelihood of a subsequent related 
industry merger wave is increasing in supplier importance. 
   
1.4.1.1 Industry & Suppliers evidence of market power motivation 
If bargaining power is a motivating factor for industry merger waves following supplier merger 
waves, I expect this relation is strongest when the supplier is experiencing higher profits (i.e. 
when the margin for which the parties bargain is greatest). To proxy for high profits, I create a 
dummy variable equal to one if the operating margin for the supplier industry in year t=0 is 
higher than the industry median operating profit over the entire sample period. Results from 
regressions including this variable and an interaction term equal to the high profit dummy times 
the supplier wave dummy are presented in columns (1) and (3) in Table 5. In specifications (1) 
and (3), the supplier high profit dummy is positive with a p-value of 22.4% and 6.2%, 
                                                 
27 Results are also similar with industry market-to-book added as control variable. The market-to-book variable is 
not significant and does not add to the explanatory power of the model.  
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respectively, indicating that an industry is more likely to undergo a merger wave when the 
supplier is experiencing higher profits but no merger wave. The supplier wave times high profit 
interaction term is negative in both specifications, suggesting that supplier high profits do not 
increase the likelihood an industry will experience a merger wave subsequent to a supplier 
merger wave.  
According to the bargaining power hypothesis, a merger wave in a supplier industry 
resulting in fewer competitors or higher concentration should be more likely to induce 
subsequent industry merger waves than one where the supplier industry remains less 
concentrated. To test this idea, specifications (2) and (4) in Table 5 include results for a 
regression which include a dummy variable equal to one if the supplier change in Herfindahl 
over the period t= -2 to t= 0 is greater than the two-year median change (0.03%) for all suppliers 
and an interaction term equal to the supplier merger wave dummy times the high change in 
Herfindahl dummy. As is consistent with results from Becker and Thomas (2011) the change in 
Herfindahl dummy is positive and significant in both specifications. This indicates that a high 
increase in the supplier Herfindahl, absent a supplier merger wave, is associated with a 
subsequent merger wave in the industry. The interaction term in regression (2) is small and 
negative, suggesting that given a supplier industry merger wave, supplier changes in 
concentration do not add to the likelihood of a subsequent industry merger wave. The only 
support for the bargaining power hypothesis is in specification (4), where the interaction term is 
positive and jointly significant with the supplier wave variable, suggesting that only supplier 
merger waves associated with increases in concentration are associated with subsequent industry 
merger waves. Taken together, the results offer little support for the bargaining power hypothesis 
of merger waves.  
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1.4.1.2 Industry & Suppliers type of industry considerations 
Past literature suggests that competitive forces other than size may affect bargaining amongst 
related industries. I expect industry participants that cannot credibly bargain using forces other 
than size to be more likely to respond to supplier industry mergers with mergers of their own. 
Past research suggests that positions of market power are found in the consumer goods industries 
(Galbraith, 1952) and firms with greater product differentiation (Porter, 1974).28
Table 6
  I therefore 
expect that non-consumer goods industries and industries with lower product differentiation are 
more likely to respond to a supplier merger wave with a subsequent merger wave. To test this 
assumption I create three dummy variables. The first is equal to one if an industry is not in a 
consumer goods industry. The other two proxy for low product differentiation and are separately 
equal to one if the industry advertising to sales ratio (Schmalensee, 1982) and R&D to sales ratio 
(Anderton, 1999) are in the bottom half of the sample. Results including these variables and 
interaction terms are given in . The last row of the table, which contains the sum of the 
coefficients and joint significance of the supplier merger wave variable and interaction term, is 
the basis of the discussion below. In specifications (1) and (5) the supplier wave variable and 
non-consumer goods interaction term are jointly positive and significant suggesting that given a 
supplier industry merger wave, non-consumer goods industries are more likely to experience a 
subsequent merger wave vs. consumer goods industries. In specifications (2) and (6) the low 
advertisement spending interaction term is jointly significant with the supplier merger wave 
measures. The low R&D interaction is not jointly significant with the supplier merger wave 
variable but is positive in specification (3). The unreported p-value for the joint significance in 
(3) is 10.5%. This is weak evidence that given a supplier merger wave, industries with low R&D 
                                                 
28 Porter (1974) finds that retailers with greater differentiation have more bargaining power. 
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are more likely to experience a merger wave. Taken together, the evidence implies that those 
industries with weaker positions of market power initially are more likely to experience a merger 
wave to gain bargaining power with suppliers subsequent to supplier merger waves. This result is 
consistent across both measures of merger wave. 
The unionization rate of an industry’s workforce may also influence its bargaining 
position with customers and suppliers. Specifically, an industry without a unionized workforce 
may be more likely to engage in merger activity for bargaining power motives because gains 
from merging will not have to be surrendered to the union.29  To control for industry 
unionization rates I include a dummy variable equal to one if the unionization rate for the 
industry year is less than the sample median (14.5%) and an interaction variable equal to the low 
industry dummy times the supplier merger wave dummy.30
Table 6
  Results are given in columns (4) and 
(8) of . A joint test of the low industry unionization dummy and interaction variable for 
both measures of merger wave indicate that given a weakly-unionized industry, an industry is 
more likely to undergo a merger wave subsequent to a supplier industry merger wave. This is 
evidence that following a supplier industry merger wave, industry merger waves are more likely 
if gains from merging do not have to be surrendered to another party, namely the union.  
1.4.1.3 Tests on the timing of merger activity 
I test if industry merger activity is sensitive to the timing of the supplier merger activity. I repeat 
the original regression equation except that my independent variable of interest is changed to 
indicate supplier merger waves beginning in years t= -3, t= -2, t= -1 (original specification), t= 0, 
                                                 
29 See Matsa (2010), Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) for union 
bargaining studies. 
30 Industry unionization rates are from www.unionstats.com. See Hirsh and Macpherson (2003). 
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and t= +1. See Table 7 for results. Specifications (1) through (5) refer to Top20_Waves and 
indicate that if a supplier industry experiences a wave beginning in year -1 (specification 3) the 
industry has increased probability of experiencing a merger wave beginning in year t= +1. This 
supports the idea that the industry merger waves occur subsequent to the supplier merger wave. 
Specifications (6) through (10) refer to waves measured as STD_Waves and indicate that if the 
supplier experiences a wave in years t= -2 or t= 0, (specifications 7 and 9) then the industry has 
increased probability of experiencing a merger wave in year t= +1. These results are also 
suggestive that the supplier merger wave occurs prior to the industry merger wave, and that 
horizontal merger waves produce a ripple effect moving along the supply chain from suppliers to 
customers. For both measures of merger wave, the results in specifications (5) and (10) where 
the supplier and industry merger wave are both measured at t= +1 (concurrent merger waves) 
suggest that the supplier and industry merger waves do not occur simultaneously.  
1.4.2 Industry & Customers results 
To examine the likelihood of industry merger waves in relation to previous customer industry 
merger waves I use the Industry & Customers sample and perform tests similar to those 
conducted previously. I find that on average, when a customer industry does not experience a 
merger wave two years prior, an industry experiences 0.047 (0.073) Top20_Waves 
(STD_Waves) per year. This increases to 0.058 (0.102) Top20_Waves (STD_Waves) per year 
when the customer industry does experience a merger wave two years previously. The difference 
in means is significant at the 5% (1%) level. To determine whether the results hold in a 
multivariate setting, I estimate several logistic regression models in which the dependent variable 
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is the probability that the industry experiences a merger wave in year t= +1. The logistic 
equations are as follows: 
 
Logit(pTop20_Wave=+1) = β0 + β1CustTop20_Wavet=-1 + β2Spreadt=-1,0 + β3Deregulationt=0 + β4Herfindahlt=0 (3) 
+ β5Principal componentt=0+ β4Industry casht=0 + S&P one year returnt=-1,0 
 
Logit(pSTD_Wave=+1) = β0 + β1CustSTD_Wavet=-1 + β2Spreadt=-1,0 + β3Deregulationt=0 + β4Herfindahlt=0 (4) 
+ β5Principal componentt=0+ β4Industry casht=0 + S&P one year returnt=-1,0   
 
 
where Top20_Wavet=+1 (STD_Wavet=+1) is a dummy variable equal to one if the industry 
experiences a merger wave beginning in year t= +1 and CustTop20_Wavet=-1 
(CustSTD_Wavet=-1) is a dummy variable equal to one if the customer industry experiences a 
merger wave beginning in year t= -1. The other variables are described in Panel A of Table 3 and 
descriptive statistics are in Panel C. Descriptive statistics are similar to those for the Industry & 
Suppliers sample. 
Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression model estimating merger waves.31
                                                 
31 P-values are based on White standard errors clustered at the industry level. 
  
Columns (1) and (4) contain results of control variables only. Columns (2) and (5) contain results 
including the customer merger wave variable. The customer wave dummy variable is positive 
and significant in specification (5) but not (2), indicating that an industry is more likely to 
undergo an STD_Wave (but not a Top20_Wave) in year t= +1 if a related customer industry has 
undergone a similarly-measured merger wave beginning in year t= -1. The odds ratio of 1.34 for 
the customer STD_Wave variable indicates that the odds of an industry experiencing a merger 
wave beginning in year t= 1 increase by a factor of 1.34 if the supplier has experienced a merger 
wave in year t= -1, holding all other variables constant. When all variables are held at their mean, 
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the probability of observing an STD_Wave in an industry is 7.4% when the customer 
STD_Wave variable is 0. This probability increases to 9.6% when the customer STD_Wave 
variable changes to 1, an increase of 29.9%. The higher Chi-squared test of all coefficients in 
model (5) as compared to model (4) (64.36 versus 53.67) indicates that the model including the 
customer STD_Wave variable improves the ability to explain the likelihood of an industry 
STD_Wave. However, the Chi-squared result for model (1) as compared to model (2) indicates 
that the customer Top20_Wave has little power to explain the probability of a subsequent 
industry Top20_Wave beyond what the control variables explain. In sum I find strong support 
that a customer industry merger wave increases the likelihood of a subsequent industry merger 
wave when the merger wave is measured as an STD_Wave. I reject the hypothesis that customer 
industry merger activity increases the likelihood of a subsequent industry merger wave when the 
merger wave is measured as an Top20_Wave. The control variables in all specifications behave 
similarly to their counterparts in the other sample with the exception of industry cash, which is 
positive but not significant, and S&P one year return, which is significant in the first three 
specifications only.32
To test if the relation of industry and customer merger waves is increasing in the 
importance of the customer, I generate a dummy variable equal to one when the customer is the 
top industrial customer for the industry, as measured by percent of output purchased. Results 
including this variable and an interaction term equal to customer merger wave times top 
customer dummy are in columns (3) and (6) of 
   
Table 8. The interaction term is positive and 
                                                 
32 Results are similar if I use the residuals from an OLS equation where the dependent variable is the Herfindahl at 
t=0 and the independent variables are Herfindahl measured at t=-1 and t=-2 as the measure of concentration. Results 
similar to the specification including Herfindahl at t=0 and Herfindahl at t=0 squared. Results are robust to the 
inclusion of the number and percent of medium sized firms in an industry, where a medium-sized firm is defined as 
one with total assets between 5% and 30% of total assets of the industry’s largest firm (see Gorton et al., 2009). 
Results are also similar if industry market-to-book is included. The market-to-book variable is not significant. 
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jointly significant with the customer STD_Wave variable in specification (6) suggesting that 
given a customer merger wave, the industry is more likely to undergo a merger wave if the 
customer is the most important one. No such relation exists for the Top20_Wave measure. Thus I 
find that, for the STD_Wave measure, the relation between the customer and related industry 
merger waves is increasing in customer importance.  
1.4.2.1 Industry & Customers evidence of market power motivation 
If bargaining power motives are at work, the relation between customer and related industry 
merger waves will be strongest when the customer is experiencing higher profits or is more 
highly concentrated. To proxy for high customer profits I use a dummy variable equal to one if 
the operating margin for the customer industry in year t= 0 is higher than the industry median 
operating profit over the entire sample period. Results are presented in columns (1) and (3) in 
Table 9. The customer wave times high profit interaction term is positive and jointly significant 
with the customer wave variable in specification (3) suggesting that given a customer 
STD_Wave the industry is more likely to experience a subsequent STD_Wave if the customer 
industry is experiencing higher profits. To proxy for high customer concentration in 
specifications (2) and (4) I include a dummy variable equal to one if the customer change in 
Herfindahl over the period t= -2 to t= 0 is greater than the two-year median change for all 
customers. Similar to results for the high profit dummy, the positive customer high change in 
Herfindahl dummy supports the idea that an industry STD_Wave is more likely to occur 
subsequent to a customer STD_Wave when market power motivations are most likely to be at 
work. A relation between customer and industry merger waves does not exist when market 
power motives are at work for the Top20_Wave measure. 
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1.4.2.2 Industry & Customers type of industry considerations 
Similar to the results for the Industry & Suppliers sample, I expect industry participants that 
cannot credibly bargain using forces other than size to be more likely to respond to supplier 
industry mergers with mergers of their own. To test this assumption as I did with the previous 
sample, I create three dummy variables. The first is equal to one if an industry does not compete 
in a consumer goods industry. The other two are separately equal to one if the industry 
advertising to sales ratio and R&D to sales ratio are in the bottom half of the sample. Results 
including these dummy variables and interaction terms equal to the customer wave times the 
industry dummy are given in Table 10. The last row contains results for the joint significance of 
the customer merger wave interaction term. In specification (5) the customer wave variable and 
interaction term are jointly significant suggesting that given a customer merger wave, non-
consumer goods industries are more likely to experience a subsequent STD_Wave vs. consumer 
goods industries. In specification (6), however, the low advertisement interaction variable is 
negative, indicating that industries with low advertisement spending are not more likely to 
experience merger waves subsequent to customer merger waves. In specification (7) the low 
R&D spending interaction term is jointly significant with the customer STD_Wave variable. 
Taken together, the results offer some evidence that those industries with initially weaker 
positions of market power are more likely to use merger activity to gain bargaining power 
subsequent to customer merger waves than are those industries with stronger positions of market 
power.  
Because those industries with a highly unionized workforce may have to surrender higher 
profits gained from bargaining to the union, I expect that industries with low unionization rates 
are more likely to engage in mergers subsequent to customer mergers versus industries that are 
26 
 
highly unionized. I control for industry unionization rates as I did with the previous sample by 
including a dummy variable equal to one if the unionization rate for the industry year is less than 
the sample median (14.5%) and an interaction variable equal to the low industry dummy times 
the customer merger wave dummy.33 Table 10 The results are given in columns (4) and (8) of . A 
joint test of the customer STD_Wave and low union interaction variable suggests that industry 
merger waves are less likely to occur subsequent to customer merger waves if the industry is not 
highly unionized, lending support to the bargaining power hypothesis for merger waves.  
1.4.2.3 Tests on the timing of merger activity 
I test if industry merger activity is sensitive to the timing of the customer merger activity. I 
repeat the original regression equation except that I include customer merger waves beginning in 
years t= -3, t= -2, t= -1 (original specification), t= 0, and t= +1. See Table 11 for results. 
Specifications (1) through (5) refer to waves measured as Top20_Waves and indicate that 
customer waves are not associated with subsequent or concurrent industry merger waves. 
Specifications (6) through (10) refer to waves measured as STD_Waves and indicate that if the 
customer experiences a wave in years t= -1, or t= +1 then the industry has increased probability 
of experiencing a merger wave in year t= +1. This gives some evidence that past customer waves 
increase the probability of subsequent industry merger waves and that customer and industry 
merger waves may occur simultaneously.  
 
                                                 
33 Industry unionization rates are from www.unionstats.com. See Hirsh and Macpherson (2003). 
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1.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
I have conducted a variety of robustness tests on both samples. The results of these tests are 
given below. Unless otherwise indicated, the results are for both samples.  
1.5.1 Single segment and frequent supplier tests 
The general results rely on Compustat annual data to identify industry merger waves and 
calculate control variables. In this database, Compustat reports only one NAICS code for the 
entire company. For firms reporting multiple segments, therefore, assets not in the company’s 
primary line of business are wrongly classified. As a robustness test, I perform my analysis using 
only single segment firm data. Results using single segment firm data to calculate merger waves 
as well as all industry control variables rely on fewer observations (22,400 for the Industry & 
Suppliers sample and 21,491 for the Industry & Customers sample) and are stronger for the 
Industry & Suppliers sample. Specifically, the supplier STD_Wave is positive and significant 
with a p-value of 6.1% for the single segment results versus 14.0% for the general results. The 
Industry & Customers results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
In the Industry & Suppliers sample, some industries appear many times as a significant 
supplier. For example, the top two suppliers, wholesale trade and real estate, are a significant 
supplier in 21.4% and 5.9% of industry-matched supplier years, respectively. When observations 
that include wholesale or real estate as the matched supplier are dropped from the sample the 
results for the Top20_Wave variable are similar.34
                                                 
34 Wholesale and retail trade industries are defined in the BEA tables very generally and include all wholesalers and 
 In the Industry & Customers sample, food 
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service and residential construction are most often named as a significant customer (4.5% and 
4.3% of the observations, respectively). When these are removed from the sample results are 
qualitatively unchanged.35
1.5.2 Randomly matched samples test 
 
To ensure it is the merger wave in the supplier (or customer) industry and not just any industry 
which significantly influences the likelihood an industry merger wave, I construct 1,000 samples 
where the industry is matched with a random industry as its supplier (or customer).36
                                                                                                                                                             
retailers across many product lines. Therefore I exclude observations where wholesale, retail, or real estate is the top 
supplier industry and find quantitatively similar results to those where just wholesale and real estate are excluded. 
  For the 
Industry & (Random) Supplier sample, the logistic regressions produce a significant coefficient 
at the 5% level on the randomly-matched supplier wave variable only 62 times for the 
Top20_Wave measure. This rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level that a merger wave in 
any industry is a predictor of a merger wave in another industry. For the Industry & (Random) 
Customer sample, the logistic regressions produce a significant coefficient at the 5% level on the 
randomly-matched customer STD_Wave variable 86 times, again providing evidence that a 
merger wave in any industry is not a predictor of a merger wave in another industry. Further, the 
average coefficient on the randomly-matched supplier industry is 0.056, which is much lower 
than the 0.292 coefficient for the Industry & Suppliers sample. Considering that industry merger 
waves cluster to form economy-wide merger waves, it is expected that a randomly matched 
sample would sometimes generate significant results. Therefore, these statistics provide 
assurance that for both samples, it is the supplier or customer merger wave that is associated with 
35 I exclude observations where wholesale, retail, food service or residential construction is the top customer 
industry and find quantitatively similar results to those where just wholesale and real estate are excluded. 
36 The randomly matched supplier or customer could be the industry’s actual supplier or customer.  
29 
 
the likelihood of a subsequent vertically related industry merger wave, not a merger wave in any 
industry.  
1.5.3 Industry relation tests  
To ensure that my results are not influenced by the way the industry-supplier and industry-
customer relations are formed, I test my results using different percentages and a different BEA 
table. For general results pertaining to the Industry & Suppliers sample, industries are matched 
with suppliers providing at least 5.0% of its inputs. When this percentage is reduced to 3.0% the 
number of observations grows to 46,891 and the supplier Top20_Wave variable continues to be 
significant with a p-value of 0.3%. The STD_Wave, which is not significant for the general 
results, is significant at the 10% level in this sample. For the Industry & Customers sample 
general results are based on customers purchasing at least 3.0% of an industry’s outputs. When 
this percentage is increased to 5.0% the number of observations falls to 14,671 and results are 
similar to the main results although with slightly larger p-values.37
Heretofore, the results are based on industry relations that are drawn using the BEA 
tables available for 2002. Although the changing industry definitions preclude me from using 
different BEA tables to draw relations throughout the dataset, I can test if my results are robust to 
another BEA table. When I use the BEA table from 1992 to develop my industry definitions and 
merger waves for the Industry & Suppliers sample I find that the STD_Wave definition results 
are much stronger than they are for the 2002 definitions (coefficient of 0.418 and significant at 
the 1% level). However, I find no relation between supplier merger waves and industry merger 
 
                                                 
37 Results are qualitatively similar for a sample composed of each industry’s top five suppliers (customers) where 
each supplier provides (customer purchases) at least 1% of industry inputs (outputs). 
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waves for the Top20_Wave definition. The supplier Top20_Wave variable is significant, 
however, if the supplier cut-off is reduced from the 5% used in the general results to 1%, which 
has been used in previous research (Shahrur, 2005).  
For the Industry & Customers sample, I find the results for the STD_Wave measure are 
similar to those presented in the main analysis. The Top20_Wave measure results, however, are 
markedly different. Specifically, the a customer merger wave and subsequent industry merger 
wave is positive and significantly related (coefficient of 0.527 and p-value of 0.8%). Therefore, 
the association between supplier (customer) merger waves and subsequent industry merger 
waves appears to be slightly weaker (stronger) for relations drawn using the 1992 BEA tables.  
1.6 CONCLUSION 
Using a large sample of all industries experiencing mergers and acquisitions from 1980 through 
2008, I find that the existence of a merger wave in a customer industry increases the likelihood 
of a merger wave in a vertically related industry by as much as 30%, depending on the definition 
of merger wave. Consistent with the theory of countervailing market power, this association 
appears strongest in cases where bargaining power motives are present. Additionally, the 
association is strongest in industries with less product differentiation and in industries not related 
to consumer goods. Also, the findings are robust to a variety of tests which provide empirical 
support that it is the special relation between the customer and the vertically related industry that 
is responsible for the association of merger waves, rather than aggregate economic conditions or 
common economic shocks. This is consistent with findings by Ahern and Harford (2011) and 
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Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) both of which find evidence of customer merger and acquisition 
activity preceding supplier merger activity. 
I also find a positive association between merger waves in supplier industries and 
subsequent merger waves in the vertically related industry. Further testing suggests this 
association is not dependent on bargaining power motives, however, it is more likely to exist for 
industries offering undifferentiated products. This result is not consistent with results by 
Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) which finds no association between supplier merger activity and 
customer merger activity. This research offers additional confirmation for the idea that merger 
waves travel along the supply chain and adds to the literature exploring how decisions made by 
managers in a customer or supplier industry affect vertically related industries. In sum, the 
results provide evidence that a customer or supplier merger wave is a significant shock 
associated with subsequent merger waves.  
Future research may explore more reasons why certain industries, such as low R&D and 
low advertising industries are able or willing to respond to supplier and customer merger waves 
with own industry merger waves. Perhaps governance factors, economies of scale or scope, or 
the importance of bargaining power in these relations make merger activity the preferred 
response to supplier merger activity. Further, there are other efficient actions managers may take 
in response to merger waves in related industries that are not tested here. Testing of these 
responses, such as recapitalizations, asset sales, or joint ventures, is left for future research. 
Finally, because I employ two separate measures of merger wave in the analysis, this paper 
demonstrates that conclusions drawn using merger wave data are sensitive to the way a merger 
wave is measured. Future research may explore how different measures of merger waves may 
lead to different empirical conclusions. 
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2.0  ESSAY 2: CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION ACROSS VERTICALLY 
RELATED INDUSTRIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The perception that a change in concentration in one industry will “spill over” into other 
vertically related industries appears to be widely held in the business press.  For instance, a 
recent Wall Street Journal article notes that “as the retail industry continues a wave of 
consolidation, apparel manufacturers are poised to accelerate their (own) acquisition activity as a 
way to increase their negotiating clout with the new retail giants.”  Along this same line of 
reasoning, another article states that “the suppliers of the gear used in the world’s 
communications networks are facing a new challenge: the sudden and rapid consolidation of 
their customers.  A wave of acquisition activity among U.S. wireless and traditional fixed-line 
carriers… is forcing the telecommunications-equipment companies to ponder their futures, 
including whether to do deals of their own.”38   Anecdotes describing similar effects frequently 
appear in articles reporting on disparate industries suggesting that these effects are perceived as 
rather widespread.39
                                                 
38 Mike Esterl, “Apparel Firms Gird for Possible Merger Wave,” The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2005.   
Christopher Roads, “Telecom-gear mergers may start to heat up – phone-sector consolidation may challenge 
survival of some equipment firms,” The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2005. 
   
39 Also, see for example, Paul Glader, “Deal Would Create No. 1 Steelmaker,” The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 
2004, which states, “The combination of the Mittals' Ispat International NV and LNM Holdings NV with ISG of 
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While the potential implications of changes in concentration in one industry being 
associated with changes in concentration in other vertically related industries are wide-reaching, 
there is little empirical research examining the validity of this notion.  This paper examines the 
importance of such an association between changes in concentration across vertically related 
industries over the period 1978-2008.  Specifically, we investigate the magnitude, timing, and 
direction of the association between changes in concentration across vertically related industries 
with an aim towards providing stylized facts on which future empirical and theoretical work can  
be based.  To the best of our knowledge, no previous paper has examined changes in 
concentration across vertically related industries in a large sample setting.40
To identify industries with significant vertical relationships, we use the benchmark input-
output (IO) tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.  For every industry i, we use the IO tables to identify the particular industry, j, (top 
customer) that purchases the largest percentage of industry i’s (supplier) output.  We refer to this 
sample of vertical relationships as the supplier-top customer sample.  Similarly, for each 
industry, i, we use the IO tables to identify the particular industry, k, (top supplier) that provides 
the largest percentage of the inputs used by industry i (customer).  We refer to this sample of 
vertical relationships as the customer-top supplier sample.  Note that the industries referred to as 
the supplier industries in the supplier-top customer sample are nearly identical to the industries 
referred to as the customer industries in the customer-top supplier sample.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the sample nomenclature that we use throughout the paper. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Richfield, Ohio, ... if successful and if followed, as expected, by further consolidation, ... could provide the 
surviving steelmakers with more consistent pricing power over raw-materials suppliers and customers.” 
40 For a review of papers examining concentration and changes in concentration, see Curry and George (1983).  Our 
paper is perhaps closest in approach to Lustgarten (1975) which relates the level of seller industry concentration 
with the level of buyer industry concentration.   
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We obtain annual measures of industry concentration from the Compustat Business 
Information File which includes sales revenues for any business segment (4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code) that comprises more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated 
yearly sales.41
Analysis of the supplier-top customer sample indicates that top customer changes in 
concentration are positively and significantly related to not only simultaneous but also 
subsequent changes in the concentration of supplier industries.  The observed relation between 
top customer changes in concentration and changes in supplier concentration persists even after 
controlling for those factors expected to influence suppliers’ own-industry changes in 
concentration.  We demonstrate that the positive association we observe between changes in top 
customer and supplier concentration is greatly diminished when we randomly match top 
customer industries with supplier industries.  Finally, we demonstrate the relation is robust to a 
variety of changes in sampling criteria, concentration measures, and regression model 
specifications.   
   Thus, our measures of industry concentration are at the business segment level 
(and not the consolidated firm level) which minimizes issues associated with aggregation across 
unrelated activities and aggregation across vertically integrated activities.       
We find that, on average, decreases in concentration in top customer industries are more 
strongly related to decreases in concentration in supplier industries than are increases in 
concentration.  However, we also find some evidence that particularly large increases in top 
customer concentration are related to large simultaneous and subsequent increases in supplier 
concentration perhaps consistent with the presence of countervailing power effects.   
                                                 
41 The Compustat segments database, like the Compustat annual consolidated database, contains information for 
nearly all firms in the U.S. and Canada with public securities (debt or equity) outstanding as well as international 
firms with American Depository Receipts traded in the U.S. 
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Results from the customer-top supplier sample indicate that changes in top supplier 
concentration are not strongly related to simultaneous and subsequent changes in customer 
concentration.  The differing results across our two samples are consistent with the association 
between changes in concentration across vertically related industries being stronger in the 
upstream direction than the downstream direction.  This finding is consistent with several recent 
papers examining the effects of major corporate events on firms’ customers and suppliers which 
generally find evidence that suppliers but not customers are significantly affected by these 
events, e.g., financial distress (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008)), horizontal mergers (Fee 
and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharya and Nain (2011)), and leveraged buyouts 
(Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009)).  
This paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe several empirical predictions 
from economic theory regarding an association between changes in concentration across adjacent 
industries and the implications of such predictions for our empirical approach.  In section 3, we 
provide details of our sample construction and our methodology to identify vertically related 
industries.  In section 4, we present results for a sample of supplier and top customer relationship 
years.  In section 5, we present results for a sample of customer and top supplier relationship 
years.  In section 6, we summarize our findings and provide some concluding remarks. 
2.2 PREDICTIONS FROM THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
Industrial organization theory has long considered the potential for changes in concentration in 
one industry to be associated with changes in concentration in vertically related industries, i.e., 
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customer and supplier industries.  Perhaps the most well-known and controversial conjecture that 
predicts such a relation is the so-called theory of countervailing power first articulated in 
Galbraith (1952).  Galbraith contends that if an industry undertakes consolidation to increase its 
degree of monopolistic or monopsonistic power, then those industries to which it sells or from 
which it buys will defend against or countervail this power by also undertaking consolidation.42  
Stigler (1954) maintains that this notion translates approximately into the hypothesis that market 
power begets market power.  Thus, the countervailing power theory predicts that we should 
observe a positive association between changes in industry concentration and changes in 
customer and/or supplier industry concentration.43
It should be noted that we might expect to observe a positive relation between changes in 
industry concentration and changes in customer and/or supplier industry concentration even 
absent “countervailing” horizontal mergers and acquisitions in the customer and supplier 
industries, e.g., see Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) and Ahern and Harford (2010).  For instance, 
Snyder (1996) demonstrates that, in an infinitely repeated procurement auction setting, firms 
undertaking horizontal mergers are able to use their newly combined purchasing power to induce 
their respective suppliers to compete on price in a winner-take-all tournament to determine who 
will be selected to sell to the merged firm.  Fee and Thomas (2004) document that supplier firms 
which win these tournaments subsequently experience significant gains in market share relative 
to those firms that lose.  Thus, under the supplier tournament scenario, we would observe an 
 
                                                 
42 See Stigler (1954) and Hunter (1958) for criticisms of the theory of countervailing power.  For more recent 
theoretical treatment of countervailing power, see for example Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Stole and Zwiebel 
(1996), Snyder (1996), Chipty and Snyder (1999), Inderst and Wey (2003), and Chen (2003). 
43 It is important to point out that the emergence of large customers may be followed by the emergence of large 
suppliers and vice versa for reasons unrelated to market power, e.g., see Coase (1937).  For instance, it may simply 
be most efficient in terms of distribution costs for large customers to be served by large suppliers, e.g., bilateral 
oligopoly is the market structure that minimizes transactions costs regardless of how the cost savings are divided up 
among market participants.  For instance, see “P&G’s Gillette Edge: The Playbook it Honed at Wal-Mart,” The 
Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2005. 
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increase in concentration for the merging firms’ industry and a change in concentration in the 
supplier firms’ industry as the market shares of the winning and losing supplier firms change to 
reflect the tournament outcome.  Assuming that more efficient suppliers have larger market 
shares and more frequently win these tournaments than less efficient suppliers, then we will 
observe an overall increase in supplier industry concentration as measured by a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).44
While the countervailing power literature examines industry consolidation, formal 
theories of how decreases in concentration in a particular industry might be associated with 
decreases in concentration in vertically related industries are not as well developed.  However, 
there are some seemingly plausible conjectures that one could make.  For instance, it is often 
hypothesized that larger firms in fast growing industries will find it difficult to take advantage of 
all of the available opportunities for expansion.  Thus, opportunities for smaller firms will be 
greater resulting in increased relative market shares for smaller firms and decreased industry 
concentration, e.g., see Mueller and Hamm (1975) and Caves and Porter (1977).  If the presence 
of recent entrants or rapid growth in market shares for smaller firms in an industry is indicative 
of increased demand for an industry’s product, then this might also indicate that supplying the 
inputs for producing such a product has also become more attractive prompting entry or rapid 
growth in market share for smaller firms in the supplier industry as well.
 
45
                                                 
44 There are scenarios where supplier industry HHI could fall as well.  However, assuming that the more efficient 
suppliers have larger market shares and more frequently win these tournaments than less efficient suppliers, the 
result would generally be an increase in HHI in the supplier industry as HHI satisfies the principle of transfers 
condition for measures of concentration.  
  Technological 
innovation in an industry is also hypothesized to result in decreases in concentration stemming 
45 For ease of exposition, we often refer to increases in concentration as consolidation and decreases in concentration 
as entry.  Clearly, these changes could be entirely due to changes in the market shares of a constant set of 
competitors, e.g., see Davies and Geroski (1997).  We provide some evidence below on how frequently increases in 
concentration are accompanied by a decrease in the number of competitors (consolidation) and how frequently 
decreases in concentration are accompanied by an increase in the number of competitors (entry).  
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from cost savings or reductions in minimum efficient scale, e.g., see Demsetz (1973) and 
Geroski and Pomroy (1990).  To the extent that related industries overlap in certain technologies, 
innovation could lead to corresponding decreases in concentration across adjacent industries.  
Deregulation of an industry is often associated with significant subsequent entry, e.g., see 
Whinston and Collins (1992) or Zingales (1998).  To the extent that deregulation or simply an 
erosion of non-regulatory barriers to entry prompts decreases in concentration in one industry, 
then we might also observe decreases in concentration in adjacent industries. 
Note that, in general, a positive association would be expected if the changes in 
concentration are due to either a common shock affecting vertically related industries or to a 
shock specific to one industry that prompts a change in concentration which then prompts 
reactionary changes in vertically related industries, i.e., spillover effects.46
                                                 
46 We consider a common shock any economic, technological, or deregulatory event that directly affects both 
industries who share a trading relationship, e.g., the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement or a labor 
strike by the United Auto Workers Union members that affects the motor vehicle manufacturing industry and the 
automotive stamping industry.  We consider a spillover effect as a situation in which an economic, technological, or 
deregulatory event directly affects one party to a trading relationship but not the other.  Thus, any effect of the event 
on the industry not directly affected is a spillover effect, e.g., deregulation of the commercial banking industry 
results in consolidation and greater bargaining power that prompts consolidation by the blankbook and looseleaf 
binder industry to countervail customers’ gains in bargaining power.  
  If we observe no 
significant association between changes in concentration across industries, then this suggests that 
changes in one industry occur largely independently of changes in concentration in vertically 
related industries.  Observing an insignificant association could also be due to low power in the 
tests due to noise introduced either by the inability to identify industries that share a significant 
trading relationship or a lack of timely measures of changes in industry concentration at a 
sufficient level of disaggregation.  Finally, it would be possible to observe a negative association; 
however, while observing such an association might be somewhat difficult to interpret under 
existing economic theory,  it would prompt further work investigating such an association. 
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Given that none of the potential explanations for a significant relation between changes in 
concentration across adjacent industries predicts a particular timeframe in which the respective 
changes in concentration should occur, our approach will be to report results for several time 
windows intended to capture a relation, i.e., simultaneous and subsequent time windows, e.g., 
see Caves and Porter (1980). 
While the primary purpose of our analysis is to determine if changes in concentration are 
correlated across vertically related industries, we also make initial efforts at determining which 
of the possible channels for this association might be in play.  For instance, we investigate the 
relation between increases in concentration vs. decreases in concentration.  Given the 
countervailing power theory suggests significant consolidation in one industry should be 
followed by significant consolidation in another, we run logistic regressions where the variables 
of interest take a value of one for large positive changes in concentration and zero otherwise.  
Finally, by contrasting the results across our two samples, we may be able to determine if there 
are asymmetric reactions to changes in concentration depending on whether the initial change in 
concentration originates with top customers or top suppliers.  In other words, we can determine 
whether the association between changes in concentration is stronger primarily upstream, 
primarily downstream, or in both directions along the supply chain. 
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2.3 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND DESCRIPTION 
2.3.1 Identifying vertical relationships 
We use the benchmark input-output tables published in 1992 by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce to identify industries with significant 
vertical relationships.47
For every industry i, we use this industry by industry matrix to identify the particular 
industry, j, (top customer) that purchases the largest percentage of industry i’s (supplier) output.  
We refer to this sample of vertical relationships as the supplier-top customer sample.  Similarly, 
for each industry, i, we use the matrix to identify the particular industry, k, (top supplier) that 
provides the largest percentage of the inputs used by industry i (customer).  We refer to this 
  The IO tables consist of a make and a use table.  The make table is an 
industry by commodity matrix which gives the value in producer’s prices of each commodity 
produced by each industry.  The use table is a commodity by industry matrix which gives the 
value of each commodity that is used as an input by each industry.  The make and use tables can 
be combined to construct an industry by industry matrix which details how much of each 
industry’s output is purchased by other industries and also how much of an industry’s inputs are 
provided by other industries.   
                                                 
47 Lawson (1997) provides a detailed description of the BEA input-output tables.  The BEA reports benchmark 
(detailed) make and use tables every five years.  We chose the 1992 tables because 1992 represents the midpoint of 
our sample period.   As a check on the potential for this choice to influence our results, we calculated the correlation 
between relationships identified using the 1992 table and those identified using tables from earlier editions of the 
BEA reports.  Relationships identified using the 1992 tables are highly correlated with the relationships identified in 
prior tables perhaps owing to the stability of vertical relationships between industries in general.  Since we use 
leading and lagged data in the tests below, it is difficult to allow identified relationships to vary over intervals within 
the sample period corresponding to different editions of the BEA reports, hence, we are in effect assuming that 
relationships identified using the 1992 table were present prior to that year and persist after that year.  To the extent 
that we misidentify parties to vertical relationships, we largely bias against finding evidence of relation between 
changes in concentration across industries as the power of our tests will be reduced. 
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sample of vertical relationships as the customer-top supplier sample.48
Appendix A  
Identifying vertically related industries
  Note that the industries 
referred to as the supplier industries in the supplier-top customer sample are nearly identical to 
the industries referred to as the customer industries in the customer-top supplier sample.  Figure 
1 describes the nomenclature that we use for the respective samples.  See 
 for further details of how the make and use tables are 
utilized to identify vertical relationships.   
2.3.2 Supplier-top customer sample relationships 
Table 12 reports information regarding the supplier-top customer sample relationships.  While 
there are 419 relationships included in this sample, we list in panel A the ten relationships where 
the identified top customers purchase the largest percentage of supplier output to provide a sense 
of the relationships in the sample.49
While we only match each supplier with its top customer in our sample, we are able to 
observe other customer industries that purchase less supplier output than the top customer.  To 
  In panel B, we provide summary statistics on the percentage 
of supplier output that is purchased by its top customer.  The average (median) percentage of a 
supplier’s output purchased by the identified top-customer industry is 19.9% (12.5%).  Thus, our 
sample construction procedure seems successful in identifying industries with significant trading 
relationships.   
                                                 
48 When the top customer or top supplier is identified as an industry for which we can obtain no Compustat data (i.e. 
personal consumption expenditures or government), we then use the industry with the next most significant trading 
relationship as the top customer until an industry with Compustat data available is reached. 
49 In order to gauge domestic supply, some final use accounts, including but not limited to inventory, fixed capital, 
scrap and imports, may be negative. As a result, there are two cases where it appears that one industry is consuming 
more than 100% of another industry’s output. In these cases, we winsorize the percent bought by the top customer 
and the percent bought by the top four customers at 100%. 
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gauge the relative concentration of the output market for supplier goods, we also report in panel 
B the percentage of supplier output purchased by its top four customer industries.  The average 
(median) percentage of a supplier’s output purchased by its top four customer industries is 34.6% 
(27.4%).  Thus, on average, the top customer industry accounts for more of the suppliers’ sales 
volume than the next three largest customer industries combined.  Note that each supplier has 
only one top customer, although the same top customer may be matched to multiple supplier 
industries.  Panel C shows the ten industries that are most frequently identified as the top 
customer industries. 
2.3.3 Customer-top supplier sample relationships 
Table 13 reports information regarding the customer-top supplier sample relationships.  There 
are 421 relationships included in this sample and we list in panel A the ten relationships where 
the top suppliers supply the largest percentage of customer inputs.  In panel B, we provide 
summary statistics on the percentage of customer inputs that are supplied by the top supplier.  
The average (median) percentage of a customer’s inputs supplied by the identified top-supplier 
industry is 12.4% (8.6%).  We also report in panel B the percentage of customer inputs 
purchased from its top four supplier industries.  The average (median) percentage of customer 
inputs supplied by its top four supplier industries is 25.8% (22.4%).  Panel C shows the ten 
industries that are most frequently identified as the top suppliers of other industries. 
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2.3.4 Comparison of supplier-top customer and customer-top supplier samples 
We conduct the same empirical analysis on both of our samples.  However, Table 12 and Table 
13 do reveal several differences in the samples that might be expected to impact what we observe 
in the respective results.  For instance, suppliers are, on average, more dependent on their top 
customers for sales revenues than customers are dependent on their top suppliers for inputs.  As 
an example, the commercial fishing industry sells 68% of its output to the prepared seafood 
industry, its top customer, whereas the prepared seafood industry purchases 38% of its inputs 
from commercial fishing, its top supplier.50
It might also be expected that suppliers are more affected by their top customers’ actions 
even absent their customers’ ability to potentially substitute among inputs as in the prepared 
seafood industry.  Moving downstream along the supply chain towards the products bought by 
ultimate consumers is generally associated with value added at each step.  Thus, customer firms 
are often purchasing inputs from more supplier industries at each step potentially rendering the 
customer firms less dependent on any particular supplier industry.
  Given that prepared seafood purchases some of its 
inputs from other industries, e.g., fish hatcheries and aquaculture, it could be argued that changes 
in the prepared seafood industry will affect commercial fishing more so than changes in 
commercial fishing will affect prepared seafood.   
51
                                                 
50 Fifty-seven of the identified relationship pairs are common to both samples. 
 
51 This reasoning is consistent with the accounting rules regarding the required disclosures by firms regarding their 
customers and suppliers.  Firms are required to report certain information about any individual customer that 
accounts for more than 10% of sales revenues.  Presumably the basis for this disclosure is so that investors can 
assess the possible revenue consequences of losing a large customer.  However, firms are not required to report any 
information regarding the identity and amount purchased from their suppliers perhaps consistent with the accounting 
standards bodies viewing information about a firm’s customers as more value-relevant for investors than information 
about a firm’s suppliers.  From 1978 to 1998, customer disclosure rules were defined in FASB 14.  From 1998-
present, customer disclosure rules are defined in SFAS 131. 
44 
 
Table 12 and Table 13 also reveal that for 22.5% of customer-top supplier relationship 
years, the “wholesale trade” industry is identified as the top supplier, as opposed to 7.8% of 
relationship years in the supplier-top customer sample where “wholesale trade” is the top 
customer.  Unfortunately, the IO tables classify wholesale trade at a high level of aggregation.  
Specifically, wholesale trade includes SIC codes 5000-5199 which essentially encompass the 
wholesaling activities of most individual industries.  In effect, changes in concentration for a 
specific wholesale trade activity are largely unobservable since they are lumped in with the 
changes in every other wholesaling activity.  Thus, a difference in results across the two samples 
might stem from the relative inability of the customer-top supplier sample to identify top 
suppliers at a reasonable level of specificity which reduces variation in changes in concentration 
and biases against finding a relation.52
Clearly, there are valid counterarguments to the reasoning above.  However, for the 
reasons outlined, as well as for ease of exposition, we report results for the supplier-top customer 
sample first and in full, and we report results for the customer-top supplier sample second and in 
abbreviated form.  We discuss where and why the results differ across the two samples in 
Section 5 when we describe results for the customer-top supplier sample. 
  
2.3.5 Measures of concentration  
We obtain annual measures of industry concentration from the Compustat database which reports 
financial information for nearly all firms in the U.S. with public securities (debt or equity) 
outstanding.  Specifically, we use the Compustat Business Information File which includes sales 
                                                 
52 The classification of “retail trade, except eating and drinking” is subject to a similar issue in that it includes SIC 
codes 5200-5799 and 5900-5999.   
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revenues for any business segment (4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code) that 
comprised more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated yearly sales.53  Thus, our measures of 
industry concentration are calculated at the business segment level rather than the consolidated 
firm level.  This approach allows us to develop measures of industry concentration that are more 
representative than if we were to assign the consolidated sales of firms with multiple unrelated 
segments or multiple vertically-related segments to one SIC code.54
Since the IO tables classify industries by IO codes and Compustat classifies segments by 
SIC codes, we use the SIC-IO code conversion tables published by Fan and Lang (2000) to 
  There are a total of 237,435 
segment years used to calculate concentration measures in our sample or approximately 7,770 
distinct segments per year on average. 
                                                 
53 The Compustat segments database, like the Compustat annual consolidated database, contains information for 
nearly all firms in the U.S. and Canada with public securities (debt or equity) outstanding as well as international 
firms with American Depository Receipts traded in the U.S.  Regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial 
institutions (SIC 6000-6999) are not regularly included in the segment data since firms in these industries generally 
do not report segment level data.  To ensure consistency, any reported segments with the SIC codes listed above are 
dropped from the sample as are segments of firms incorporated outside of the U.S.  The segments database is also 
susceptible to occasional instances of double counting of segments.  These instances arise when Compustat records 
historic segment data for newly-formed public companies that were previously segments of other public firms, i.e., 
spin-offs or carve-outs.  Compustat may also assign multiple permanent identifiers (gvkeys) to one company if the 
company has multiple classes of securities outstanding.  Thus, we investigate all instances where segments report 
the same exact sales revenues and SIC code for a given year and remove observations that are duplicates.  There are 
a total of 2,390 duplicate observations removed from the dataset. 
54 Using Compustat segment data as the source of our measures of industry concentration offers several advantages 
and disadvantages relative to alternatives such as the Census of Manufacturers publications produced by the Center 
for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census, e.g., see Davis and Duhaime (1992) and Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 
(2009).  The Census surveys establishments only every five years which makes measuring changes in industry 
concentration over shorter periods impossible.  The Census publications only include data on manufacturing firms 
whereas Compustat is much more comprehensive in its industry coverage.  The Census publications do however 
include private firms, although concentration ratios are only available for the largest 50 companies in an industry or 
all firms in the industry if less than 50.  Compustat offers no such limitation on the number of segments in an 
industry.  Compustat, strictly speaking, does not include private firms.  However, as we note elsewhere, Compustat 
backfills data for private firms that complete IPOs and leveraged buyout (LBO) targets often continue to report 
financial data as a result of having public debt outstanding.  Given that (at least within the manufacturing sector) the 
biggest difference between Compustat and Census data are the inclusion of private firms, we also examine results 
using four-firm concentration ratios since these ratios are likely to be the least affected by excluding private firms 
given the strong tendency for the largest firms in an industry to have accessed public capital.  While the Business 
Information Tracking Series (BITS) data might appear to be a viable alternative to the Census of Manufacturers, 
BITS does not report sales data by establishment and must be merged with Compustat to obtain sales figures.  
Further, BITS only becomes available in 1989, see Villalonga (2004).  Trinet establishment data were also 
considered, e.g., see Liebskind, Opler, and Hatfield (1996); however, this data series ends in 1989. 
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assign each segment from the Compustat dataset an IO code.  Once each segment has an 
assigned IO code, we combine data within each IO-code year to generate industry data.  The IO 
code classification system generates industries that are slightly more general than four-digit SIC 
codes but importantly does not include both producers and consumers in the same code.55
As our primary measure of concentration we use the annual Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of the 
industry’s total sales.  Thus, for industry i in year t, HHI is measured as 
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where Nit is the number of segments in industry i at time t and Salesjit are the net sales 
attributable to segment j of industry i at time t.  Changes in HHI are calculated as the ratio of 
HHI at one point in time over HHI at another point in time, minus one, e.g., the one year ahead 
change in HHI is calculated as (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1.  HHI is increasing in the concentration level 
of an industry and positive changes in HHI over time indicate an industry is becoming 
increasingly concentrated whereas negative changes in HHI over time indicate that an industry is 
becoming less concentrated.  In robustness tests, we also use four-firm concentration ratios 
calculated as the fraction of total industry sales accounted for the by the four firms with the 
largest sales. 
                                                 
55 While every SIC code has an IO code, not all IO codes are matched by Fan and Lang (2000) with an SIC code.  
For the supplier- top customer sample, if a supplier industry has no associated SIC code, then that relationship is 
dropped.  Likewise for the customer- top supplier sample, if a customer industry has no assigned SIC code, then that 
relationship is also dropped.  However, for relationships where an identified top customer or top supplier IO code is 
not matched with an SIC code, we use the industry with the next most significant trading relationship as the top 
customer or top supplier provided that it also has an IO-SIC code correspondence in Fan and Lang.  Results for 
subsequent time windows when these “secondary” relationship pairs are excluded are very similar to those reported.  
However, results for simultaneous time windows are weaker. 
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2.4 RESULTS FOR SUPPLIER-TOP CUSTOMER SAMPLE 
2.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 14 reports descriptive statistics for concentration and changes in concentration within the 
supplier-top customer sample.  The average supplier industry year is populated with 19.6 distinct 
segments and has a mean (median) HHI of 4,583.8 (3,848.9).  Consistent with the findings of 
most prior studies of changes in concentration, the supplier industries in our sample experienced 
an average increase in concentration over each of the windows reported.  For instance, the 
average annual percentage change in supplier industry HHI is an increase of 4.3% across all 
relationship years.  Changes in concentration over longer time windows are increasing in the 
number of years that elapse.  The average annual change in the number of segments in a supplier 
industry when the one-year change in HHI is positive (negative) is a decrease (increase) of 1.1 
(0.7) segments, i.e., approximately an exit of one segment (entry of seven tenths of a segment).56
The average top customer industry year is populated with 100.5 distinct segments and has 
a mean (median) HHI of 2,231.2 (1,230.2).  Thus, identified top customer industries tend to have 
more participants than the supplier industries and, consequently, top customer industries are less 
concentrated as well.  The average top customer industry experienced an increase in 
concentration over each of the windows reported.  For instance, the average annual percentage 
change in top customer industry HHI is an increase of 3.2% across all relationship years.  The 
average annual change in the number of segments in a top customer industry when the one-year 
change in HHI is positive (negative) is a decrease (increase) of 3.4 (0.5) segments, i.e., an exit of 
 
                                                 
56 For evidence on patterns of entry and exit in the U.S., see, e.g., Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988). 
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over three segments (entry of one half of a segment).  Aggregate sales (in 2008 dollars) of top 
customer industries are larger than aggregate sales of supplier industries; however, there are 
generally more segments in the customer industries relative to the supplier industries. 
Given that there is no a priori guide to the precise timing of changes in concentration 
across industries, we will report abbreviated results for a number of different time windows, e.g., 
see Caves and Porter (1980).  However, we initially report full results of a multivariate 
regression explaining changes in supplier concentration over the period from t=0 to t=+3, which 
we use as a candidate regression.  Table 15 reports summary statistics for the independent 
variables that will be included in the candidate regression.  To be included in this particular 
specification, the relationship pairs must have change in HHI data available for the period t=0 to 
t=+3 for the suppliers and for the period t=-3 to t=0 for the top customers.   
Panel A reports summary statistics for factors specific to the individual supplier 
industries.  We calculate the growth rate of inflation adjusted total industry sales from t=-2 to 
t=0.  We construct a deregulation dummy variable that is set equal to one if the supplier industry 
experienced deregulation from t=-1 to t=0.  Most of the data on deregulation events are obtained 
from Economic Reports to the President.57  Import market share is the customs value (in dollars) 
of products imported into the US with the same IO code as the supplier industry divided by the 
supplier industry’s total sales at t=0.  If import data are missing from the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database for a particular industry, then this variable is set to zero.58
                                                 
57 Specifically, sources include the Economic Report to the President for years 1989, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 
2005, www.consumerreports.org, www.naturalgas.org and Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (1995). 
  
Missing imports flag is a dummy variable equal to one if the import data are missing for a 
particular industry.  Median industry advertising to sales is the industry median advertising to 
58 See Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) for details. 
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sales ratio at t=0.  The median is calculated using data from all single segment firms in each 
industry since advertising expenditures are not reported at the segment level.  If there are no 
single segment firms, then we use data from all two-segment firms operating in the industry.     
The first principal component is the first principal component of the absolute value of the 
two year change (from t=-2 to t=0) of the following supplier industry ratios: asset turnover (total 
sales/assets), earning power (operating income/assets), profit margin (operating income/sales), 
and capital expenditures (capital expenditures/assets).  The statistic is calculated as the median 
value for all the segments in the industry.  We include the first principal component in the 
regression rather than the individual ratios since including all of the ratios in the regression 
would lead to problems with multicollinearity.  The first principal component is set equal to zero 
if data required to calculate it are missing.  The missing principal component flag is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the first principal component is missing and zero otherwise. 
Panel B reports summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables.  Harford (2005) 
finds that the timing of merger waves, i.e., significant increases in concentration within an 
industry, is associated with not only economic shocks to that industry but also the availability of 
financing to undertake transactions.  Thus, we include in our regressions the commercial and 
industrial loan rate spread above the intended Federal funds rate as of December t=0.  Data to 
calculate spread are obtained from the survey of terms of business lending published quarterly by 
the Federal Reserve.59
                                                 
59 The intended Federal funds rate is available from 1986 to the present. Before 1986 we use the actual Federal funds 
rate to estimate the intended rate. The commercial and industrial loan rate spread is available quarterly from 1977 to 
the present. 
  Prior research has found that both entry (decreased concentration) and 
merger (increased concentration) activity follow increases in stock prices.  Thus, we include the 
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S&P 500 2-year return which is the 2-year compounded annual return on the S&P 500 for the 
period ending at t=0.  S&P 500 levels are obtained from finance.yahoo.com.  
2.4.2 Multivariate regressions explaining changes in supplier concentration 
Table 16 reports the results of a multivariate regression explaining changes in supplier 
concentration over the period from t=0 to t=+3.  Consistent with Petersen (2008), we cluster 
standard errors by supplier industry code.60
                                                 
60 Our reasons are twofold.  First, for the regression specifications that measure supplier concentration changes over 
a period greater than one year, there is some overlap from observation to observation, i.e., the change from t=0 to 
t=+3 in one relationship year is measured over two-thirds of the same years as the change from t=0 to t=+3 in the 
subsequent relationship year.  Note that in specifications where the dependent variable is measured over a one year 
window, the overlap in adjacent observations is not an issue.  Our reported results are very similar when we cluster 
standard errors by both year and IO code.  Further, our results are similar, but more significant, when we do not 
cluster standard errors and only correct for heteroskedasticity.  Second, unidentified factors that affect each industry 
similarly may exist.  For these two reasons observations may not be entirely independent.  Thus, clustering standard 
errors by industry represents a conservative approach to evaluating statistical significance relative to not clustering 
standard errors by industry. 
  Changes in supplier concentration are positively and 
significantly associated with lagged changes in top customer concentration.  We include supplier 
industry HHI at t=0 as an explanatory variable to control for the initial level of concentration in 
the industry as well as perhaps to correct for the boundedness in changes in concentration.  Initial 
HHI enters the regression with a small but highly significant negative coefficient suggesting that 
industries with higher initial levels of concentration are less likely to experience a further 
increase in concentration and are more likely to experience a decrease in concentration, e.g., see 
Curry and George (1983).  Higher sales revenues (greater market size) are associated with 
subsequent reductions in supplier industry concentration.  We also include the growth rate of 
inflation adjusted supplier industry sales from t=-2 to t=0.  If in faster growing industries large 
established firms find it more difficult to take advantage of all the opportunities for expansion, 
then opportunities for small firms will be greater, resulting in a reduction in concentration.  
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However, the coefficient on sales growth is positive although very small and not significantly 
different from zero. 
The deregulation dummy enters the regression with a negative but insignificant 
coefficient.  The imports market share variable is positive and significant consistent with 
industries which face greater competition from imports increasing concentration.  The dummy 
variable for missing imports data enters the regression with a negative and significant coefficient.  
Given that imports data from the Census is generally missing for non-manufacturing industries, 
the negative coefficient on this variable can be interpreted as indicating that changes in 
concentration are more generally negative for industries that are not part of the broad 
manufacturing classification, e.g., service industries.   
Product differentiation created via advertising could act as a barrier to entry, e.g., see 
Mueller and Rogers (1980) and Sutton (1991).  Thus, we include supplier-industry median 
advertising to sales; however, advertising expenditures enter the regression with a negative and 
marginally significant coefficient.  The principal component variable is positive and significant 
consistent with industry shocks leading to increases in concentration as in Harford (2005).61
The coefficient on the spread variable is negative and significant suggesting that higher 
spreads are associated with smaller increases in concentration.  This result is consistent with 
Harford (2005) in that higher spreads indicate less financing is available on favorable terms to 
fund acquisitions and observed changes in concentration are smaller given fewer firms 
undertaking horizontal acquisitions.  The coefficient on the 2-year return on the S&P 500 is 
positive but not significant at conventional levels in this specification.  The positive coefficient is 
   
                                                 
61 In addition to the four ratios that we use to extract the first principal component variable, Harford (2005) also 
includes the changes in employees and research and development expense; however, these additional measures are 
not required disclosures for business segments. 
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consistent with recent positive stock returns being associated with greater future merger activity 
and an increase in industry concentration. 
In sum, at least for the particular time windows examined in Table 16, a significantly 
positive relation between changes in top customer concentration and subsequent changes in 
supplier concentration is apparent even when including other variables expected to explain 
changes in supplier industry concentration.  The R-squared reported in Table 16 is not large, as is 
generally the case for studies of changes in concentration.  However, we note that the windows 
over which we are examining changes in concentration are considerably shorter than those in 
previous studies, e.g., Mueller and Hamm (1974), Wright (1978), and Pryor (1994).  
Table 17 presents the results of 15 multivariate regressions where the dependent variable 
is the change in supplier industry HHI over the indicated time window and the independent 
variable of interest is the change in top customer industry HHI over the indicated time window.  
The coefficients on the change in top customer industry HHI variables are reported along with 
their p-values in brackets and the number of relationship years included in the particular 
regression specification in italics.  Additional control variables as identified in Table 16 are also 
included in each specification but results for these additional variables are not reported to 
conserve space.  The top nine cells of the table correspond to regressions of top customer 
changes in concentration on subsequent changes in supplier concentration.  In six out the nine 
specifications, changes in supplier concentration are positively and significantly associated with 
lagged changes in top customer concentration.  The bottom three rows of the table correspond to 
regressions of simultaneous changes in top customer concentration on changes in supplier 
concentration.  In four out the six specifications, the change in top customer concentration is 
significantly positively associated with a simultaneous change in supplier concentration.  Thus, 
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the results indicate that changes in the level of concentration of supplier industries generally 
occur both subsequent to and simultaneous with changes in concentration in top customer 
industries. 
2.4.3 Robustness tests and additional results 
We also conducted our analysis when changes in concentration were measured as raw changes in 
HHI over each time period as well as the natural logarithm of the ratio of beginning and ending 
HHI.  The multivariate results using raw changes and log changes are very similar to those 
reported for percentage changes.  We also repeated our analysis using four-firm concentration 
ratios.  Results using changes in four-firm concentration ratios are similar to those reported.  
Given that the largest four firms in an industry are relatively more likely to all have public 
securities outstanding, results for this measure are less sensitive to the exclusion of private firms 
by Compustat than are HHIs, e.g., see Ali et al. (2009).  In sum, our reported results for suppliers 
and top customers are not particularly sensitive to the definition or functional form of our 
measures of changes in concentration.   
Our industry concentration measures are obtained from Compustat and Compustat has 
increased its coverage over the time period of our sample.  Thus, if Compustat is adding firms 
across all industries which reduces our HHI measures, we might expect to observe a positive 
correlation between supplier and top customer changes in concentration.  Note that the summary 
statistics in Table 14 suggest that the average supplier and top customer industries in Compustat 
experienced increased concentration which is inconsistent with expanded coverage perhaps 
accounting for the positive relation that we observe in Table 17.  However, we investigate in 
54 
 
Table 18 whether any secular trends in Compustat might account for, at least in part, the 
observed positive relation between supplier and top customer changes in concentration. 
Table 18 presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is 
the change in supplier industry HHI over the indicated time period and the independent variable 
of interest is the change in top customer industry HHI over the indicated time period.  The 
change in top customer HHI is for a randomly assigned industry which cannot be the top 
customer industry identified from the benchmark IO tables.  For each time period considered, we 
construct 1,000 samples where the customer industries are assigned randomly (with replacement) 
to the supplier industries.  The reported coefficients are the average coefficients obtained from 
the 1,000 regressions run on these samples.  The frequency with which the coefficient on the 
change in random top customer HHI is significant at the 5% level in the 1,000 individual 
regressions is reported in the second row.  We also test whether the frequency of significant 
coefficients on the random top customer change in HHI is significantly greater than 0.050 at the 
5% level using a one-sided binomial test.  Additional control variables as identified in Table 16 
are also included in each specification but results for these additional variables are not reported 
to conserve space. 
The coefficients on the randomly assigned top customer change in HHI are uniformly 
positive and in 11 cases significantly more than 50 of the individual coefficients from each 1,000 
regressions were significant at the 5% level.  However, most important for our purposes is that 
the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 18 are generally between 3.3 and 8.8 times smaller 
than the significant coefficients reported in Table 17 where suppliers were matched with their 
actual top customers.  Thus, there is little evidence that the positive relation in Table 17 is due 
primarily to secular trends in changes in concentration among industries in Compustat. 
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Segments generally have to be part of a firm with publicly traded securities and represent 
at least 10% of total firm sales to be reported by the firm and included in Compustat.  Therefore, 
going private transactions, reverse leveraged buyouts, initial public offerings, acquisitions of 
private firms or their assets by public acquirers, or growth in a distinct business line to greater 
than 10% of the consolidated sales of a firm will affect our measures of industry concentration.62
Table 17
  
We therefore used data from Thomson Financial’s New Issues and Mergers and Acquisitions 
databases to determine if any firms in an industry were involved in a going private transaction, 
initial public offering, or an acquisition of a private target for each year of our sample.  We 
constructed  dummy variables that take a value of one if any firm in the industry was involved in 
an IPO, going private transaction, or an acquisition of a private target, respectively in year t=0 
and included these dummies in the multivariate regressions of .  The coefficients on the 
IPO and acquisition of private target variables each enter the regressions with significant 
negative coefficients while the going private variable is generally, but not always, negative and 
significant.  Again, the coefficients on changes in customer concentration when these variables 
where included are very similar to those reported in Table 17. 
As a more general check on how our results are affected by firms with significant market 
shares either entering or exiting (for whatever reason) the industries in our sample, we repeated 
the analysis of Table 17 and included, respectively, dummy variables indicating whether a firm 
with market share greater than 15% or 25% or simply the firm with the largest market share 
either enters or exits the supplier industry in the time window examined.  The coefficients on the 
                                                 
62 Note that entry in our data does not require an IPO; entry only requires that an operating segment grow to 
represent 10% of consolidated revenue for a firm with public debt or equity outstanding.  Backfilling of data by 
Compustat often results in several years of financial data for firms prior to issuing securities to the public so that 
changes in our measures of industry concentration are better indicators of entry than they might first appear.  For 
instance, Google Inc. conducted its equity IPO on August 19th, 2004 and Compustat has financial data for Google 
starting in fiscal year 2002.  See Liebeskind, Opler, and Hatfield (1996) for evidence regarding concentration levels 
and corporate restructuring activity. 
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dummies indicating the exit (entry) of a firm with significant market share are uniformly positive 
(negative) and highly significant.  The coefficients on changes in customer concentration when 
these variables where included are in all cases very similar to or of greater significance than 
those reported in Table 17.  In short, this is strong evidence that our results are not driven merely 
by changes in our concentration measures resulting from changes in firms’ public/private status 
or Compustat-assigned SIC codes. 
To further assess the robustness of our results, we rerun our tests on various subsamples 
of the data.  Specifically, to investigate whether the change in segment reporting standards in 
1998 affects our results, we rerun our tests on the sample for years 1978 through 1998 and find 
significant results in four of the subsequent time windows.  Given that this period largely 
predates the growth in internet firms, it appears that our results are not driven by either changes 
in segment reporting or the internet entry wave of the late 1990s.  We also split the sample into 
two subperiods at roughly the midpoint, i.e., 1978 through 1992 and 1993 through 2008.  Results 
for the 1978 to 1992 subperiod are significant in simultaneous windows only and results for the 
1993 to 2008 are largely insignificant.  
We also rerun our tests on the subsamples where top customers purchase at least 1%, 5%, 
or 10% of supplier output.  Results for the 1% and 5% subsamples are similar to those reported 
and stronger in the subsequent windows than reported.  Statistically significant coefficients for 
the subsample where the top customers purchase at least 10% of supplier output are found only 
in the subsequent windows and the significance is slightly lower.  However, the number of 
observations drops considerably with this screen in place.63
                                                 
63 As mentioned earlier, if the BEA make and use tables identify an industry’s top customer as something other than 
an industry (i.e. the government, or personal consumption) we use the industry with the highest purchases from the 
supplier industry as the top customer. Although this practice may bias us against finding results, we run our tests on 
  We also rerun our tests on the 
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subsamples of relationships where the supplier and top customer industries each had a minimum 
of four segments.  Given there may be antitrust restrictions that limit changes in concentration in 
industries with few competitors, this screen should result in a sample where an increase in 
concentration is perhaps feasible.  The results are similar but slightly weaker than those reported.  
2.4.4 Changes in supplier concentration when top customer industries consolidate 
As discussed in Section 2, the positive relation between changes in supplier and top customer 
concentration could reflect consolidation in one industry being associated with consolidation in 
another and/or decreased concentration in one industry being associated with decreased 
concentration in another.  To better assess the source of the positive relation, we augment the 
multivariate specifications of Table 17 with a term interacting the change in top customer HHI 
with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the change in top customer HHI is positive.  This 
piecewise linear specification allows us to contrast the relation between supplier and top 
customer changes in concentration when the change in customer concentration is negative 
(decreased concentration) vs. positive (increased concentration).  Table 19 reports, for the 
indicated time windows, the coefficient on the change in top customer HHI in the top row and 
the coefficient on the interaction term in the second row.  The third row presents the p-value, in 
brackets, from an F test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the change in 
top customer HHI and the interaction term is zero.  In other words, we test whether the slope of 
                                                                                                                                                             
a subsample of the data where suppliers are excluded if the actual top customer is not an industry. The results are 
similar to those reported in the subsequent time windows. There is no significant relationship found in the 
simultaneous time windows. 
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the relation between changes in top customer and supplier concentration is different from zero 
over the range where changes in top customer concentration are positive. 
In general, the coefficients on changes in top customer HHI are positive and most often 
significant for those windows where supplier changes in concentration are subsequent to top 
customer changes.  Hence, there is generally a significant positive relation between decreases in 
customer concentration and subsequent decreases in supplier concentration.  The coefficients on 
the interaction term are uniformly negative and in several instances significant; however, when 
we test the hypothesis that the two coefficients sum to zero, we fail to reject this hypothesis for 
these windows.  Thus, it appears as if the positive relation between changes in customer 
concentration and subsequent changes in supplier concentration is driven substantially by 
decreases in concentration in customer industries being followed by decreases in supplier 
industries perhaps as a result of technological innovation, e.g., see Blair (1972) and Geroski and 
Pomroy (1990).   
There are no simultaneous windows where the coefficients on the change in customer 
HHI and the interaction term are significant.  This suggests that, in the case of simultaneous 
changes in concentration, the observed positive relation between changes in customer and 
supplier concentrations is not driven by decreases in concentration.  Rather, both the increases 
and decreases in concentration account for the general results.  
As an additional check of the ability of the countervailing power story to, in part, explain 
the positive relation that we observe between changes in top customer concentration and 
subsequent changes in supplier concentration, we examine the association of large positive 
changes in top customer concentration with large positive changes in supplier concentration.  
Specifically, we run a multivariate logistic regression where the dependent variable is a dummy 
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variable that takes a value of one if the change in supplier HHI over a given period is above the 
75th percentile of all changes in supplier HHI.  We similarly transform the change in top 
customer HHI to be a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the change in top customer 
HHI is above the 75th percentile of changes in customer HHI.  Additional control variables as 
identified in Table 16 are also included in each specification but results for these additional 
variables are not reported to conserve space.   
Table 20 presents the results of these regressions.64
2.5 RESULTS FOR CUSTOMER TOP-SUPPLIER SAMPLE  
  There are one subsequent and three 
simultaneous time windows in which large increases in top customer concentration are positively 
and significantly related to subsequent large increases in supplier industry concentration as 
predicted by countervailing power story.  Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) and Ahern and Harford 
(2010) document increased acquisition activity in supplier industries following mergers in 
customer industries.  Our results are consistent with the net effects of these transactions being 
significant simultaneous and subsequent increases in concentration in adjacent industries. 
2.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 21 reports descriptive statistics for concentration and changes in concentration within the 
customer-top supplier sample.  Not surprisingly, the summary statistics for customer industries 
                                                 
64 We also performed similar regressions for large decreases in concentration, i.e., dummy variable that takes a value 
of one if the change in supplier HHI over a given period is below the 25th percentile of all changes in supplier HHI 
over the same period.   The customer change in concentration coefficient is significant in eight of the nine 
subsequent time windows and two of the six simultaneous time windows. These results are therefore slightly 
stronger than those reported in the Table 19 piecewise linear regressions. 
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are very similar to those reported for supplier industries in Table 14 since these are very nearly 
the same industries.  The average top supplier industry year is populated with 136.0 distinct 
segments and has a mean (median) HHI of 1,985.9 (925.2).  Thus, identified top supplier 
industries tend to have more participants than the customer industries and, consequently, the top 
supplier industries are less concentrated as well.  Also, the average supplier industry experienced 
an increase in concentration over each of the windows reported.  For instance, the average annual 
percentage change in top supplier industry HHI is an increase of 4.1% across all relationship 
years.  We note that the average annual percentage change in customer industry HHI is an 
increase of 4.3% across all relationship years.  The average annual change in the number of 
segments in a customer industry when the one-year change in HHI is positive (negative) is a 
decrease (increase) of 1.1 (0.7) segments, i.e., the exit of approximately one segment (entry of 
seven tenths of a segment).  The average annual change in the number of segments in a top 
supplier industry when the one-year change in HHI is positive (negative) is a decrease (increase) 
of 4.7 (0.9) segments, i.e., the exit of four and seven tenths segments (entry of approximately one 
segment).  
2.5.2 Multivariate regressions explaining changes in customer concentration 
Table 22 presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the 
change in customer industry HHI over the indicated time period and the independent variable of 
interest is the change in top supplier industry HHI over the indicated time period.  Additional 
control variables as identified in Table 16 are also included in each specification but results for 
these additional variables are not reported.  The coefficients are uniformly smaller than those 
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from Table 17 and much less frequently significant.  However, there is a sizeable coefficient 
which is significant at the 5% level in the three-year simultaneous window. 
2.5.3 Robustness tests and additional results 
While most of the results reported above for the customer-top supplier sample are insignificant, 
we have conducted the same additional analysis and robustness tests that were described for the 
supplier-top customer sample.  There are several instances where this analysis revealed 
interesting results.  First, results using changes in four-firm concentration ratios are generally 
positive and significant for nearly all of the windows.  Second, for the subsample of non-
manufacturing industries, there are several instances where changes in top supplier HHI are 
positively and significantly related to subsequent changes in customer HHI.  Third, we do find 
that, when the sample relationships are restricted to those where the top supplier provides a 
minimum of 5% of customer inputs, changes in top supplier concentration are positively and 
significantly related to subsequent changes in customer concentration in two time windows in the 
multivariate analysis.  Specifically, the change in top supplier concentration from t=-1 to t=0 is 
significantly related to the change in customer concentration from t=0 to t=+2 and the change in 
top supplier concentration from t=-2 to t=0 is significantly related to the change in customer 
concentration from t=0 to t=+1. 
Taken together, the results using the alternative measure of concentration and from the 
two subsamples indicate the existence of a relation between top supplier changes in 
concentration and changes in customer concentration.  However, the fact that results from the 
entire sample as well as most of the other subsamples and specifications reveal only limited 
evidence of such effects offers a caveat to this conclusion. 
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2.5.4 Differences in results across the samples 
The results in the supplier-top customer sample are much stronger than those for the customer-
top supplier sample.  As mentioned above, the differing results across the two samples are 
potentially informative subject to the caveat that there are differences in the samples as detailed 
in section 3.4.  The results for the respective samples are strongly consistent with changes in 
concentration traveling from customers to suppliers but there is much weaker evidence consistent 
with changes in concentration traveling from suppliers to customers.  In other words, we find 
evidence consistent with changes in buyer market power being more important than changes in 
seller market power. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the timing, magnitude, and direction of the association between changes 
in industry concentration across vertically related industries over the period 1978-2008.  We find 
that changes in industry concentration in top customer industries are positively associated with 
subsequent and simultaneous changes in concentration in supplier industries.  Further, we find 
that the positive observed relation is due in part to decreases in concentration in top customer 
industries being associated with decreases in concentration in supplier industries.  We also find 
some evidence consistent with countervailing power motives as a factor in changes in 
concentration.  On balance, we find limited evidence that changes in concentration in top 
supplier industries are associated with changes in concentration in customer industries.  Our 
results suggest that additional theoretical and empirical investigation is warranted to increase our 
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understanding of the mechanisms whereby a change in concentration in one industry translates 
into a change in concentration in a vertically related industry. 
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APPENDIX A  
IDENTIFYING VERTICALLY RELATED INDUSTRIES 
This Appendix describes the benchmark input-output (IO) tables published by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce and explains how I use these tables to 
match each industry with customers and suppliers.  
The make table is an industry by commodity matrix which gives the value in producer’s 
prices of each commodity produced by each industry. Every industry is designated as a primary 
producer for a certain commodity, and is often a secondary producer for other commodities. For 
example, industry 240400, envelopes, is the primary producer of commodity 240400, envelopes, 
and a secondary producer of eight other commodities including scrap (81001), die-cut paper and 
paperboard and cardboard (240703), and stationary, tablets and related products (240706).  
The use table is a commodity by industry matrix which gives the value of each 
commodity c that is used by each industry j, or final non-industry consumer (government or 
personal consumption expenditures) in producer prices. For example, the top consumers of 
commodity 240400, envelopes, in order of significance, are personal consumption expenditures 
(910000), banking (700100), state and local government consumption, wholesale trade (690100), 
federal government consumption (980021) and retail trade except eating and drinking 
establishments (690200).  
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I begin with the make table to determine the percentage of each commodity that each 
industry makes, or each industry k’s market share of commodity c. The market share of industry 
k’s production of commodity c is defined as  
∑
=
= K
k
ck
ck
ck
make
make
share
1
,
,
,
, 
where makek,c is the amount of industry k’s output of commodity c from the make table. The 
summation in the denominator is the total output of a commodity produced by all industries. I 
use a constant market share assumption to derive the amount that each consumer purchases from 
each industry. That is if industry i produces 90% of commodity one then a consumer industry j 
will purchase 90% of its commodity one inputs from industry k. 
Using the market share number and the use table, I then calculate the dollar value that 
each buyer industry contributes to each producing industry. I call this revenue share. Thus for 
supplier industry k and customer industry j 
∑
=
=
C
c
jcck usesharejkrevshare
1
,, )*(),(
, 
where usec,j is the amount of the commodity c used by industry j.  Revshare is a producer 
industry by consumer industry matrix that can be used to find a top customer and a top supplier 
for each industry. Finally, to generate the percentage of each producer industry k’s output 
consumed by customer industry j, I define  
i
jk
jk output
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I use this CUST_percent as the guide to match customers with each industry. 
Additionally, each industry’s customers are ranked by the percentage purchased from the 
supplying industry. The customer industry (excluding government and personal consumption) 
that purchases the most from the supplying industry is the top customer.  
Similarly, to find top suppliers I define  
j
jk
kj output
revshare
percentSUPP ,,_ =
, 
where 
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==
===
C
c
jcj
C
c
cjj useusemakeoutput
1
,
1
,
. 
I use this SUPP_percent as a guide to match each industry with suppliers. Additionally, I 
rank each industry’s suppliers by percentage supplied to the customer industry. The top supplier 
is the supplier with the highest ranking and this forms the customer–top supplier pair. 
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Figure 1: Horizontal mergers 
The bars are the number of horizontal mergers (left axis) by year and the line is the total transaction value 
of horizontal mergers in billions of 2008 dollars (right axis) per year. 
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Figure 2: Number of merger waves 
Figure depicts the number of industry merger waves by year. Top20_Wave, dashed line, is equal to one if 
the industry experienced an Top20_Wave and zero otherwise. An industry experiences an Top20_Wave if 
the two year moving average of adjusted acquisition activity is in the top 20% of the sample, the industry 
had at least three mergers in the first year of the wave, and the previous two years did not contain a wave. 
STD_Wave, solid line, is equal to one if the industry experienced an STD_Wave and zero otherwise. An 
industry experiences an STD_Wave if the one year adjusted acquisition activity is at least one standard 
deviation above the industry mean measured over the sample period. 
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Figure 3: Sample nomenclature 
For every industry i, we use the benchmark input-output (IO) tables published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce to identify the particular industry, j, (top customer) that 
purchases the largest percentage of industry i’s (supplier) output.  We refer to this sample of vertical 
relationships as the supplier-top customer sample.  Similarly, for each industry, i, we use the IO tables to 
identify the particular industry, k, top supplier) that provides the largest percentage of the inputs used by 
industry (customer).  We refer to this sample of vertical relationships as the customer-top supplier sample. 
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Table 1: Industry & Suppliers merger descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Industry descriptive statistics 
Table contains descriptive statistics for the industries in the Industry & Suppliers sample. Horizontal 
mergers is the number of horizontal mergers in an industry year. Transaction value is the sum of 
transaction values of all mergers in the industry in the year in billions of 2008 dollars. Market value assets 
is the total market value of assets in the industry at fiscal yearend in billions of 2008 dollars. Adjusted 
acquisition activity is the total transaction value of all deals in the industry in the year divided by the sum 
of industry total market value of assets. Top20_Wave (STD_Wave) is equal to one if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave (STD_Wave) and zero otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined 
in Figure 2. Adjusted acquisition activity is Winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
  Num Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Horizontal mergers 38,852 4.252 1.000 19.056 0.000 609.000 
Transaction value 38,852 0.572 0.000 4.431 0.000 243.279 
Market value assets 38,852 32.886 2.973 159.550 0.000 3,394.906 
Adjusted acquisition activity 38,852 0.030 0.000 0.131 0.000 1.093 
Top20_Wave 38,852 0.051 0.000 0.220 0.000 1.000 
STD_Wave 38,852 0.075 0.000 0.264 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Related supplier descriptive statistics 
Table contains descriptive statistics for the related suppliers in the Industry & Suppliers sample. Percent 
supplied is the percent of commodity inputs supplied to the industry by the supplier industry. All other 
variables are as defined in Panel A.  
 
  Num Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Horizontal merger 38,497 29.451 3.000 63.864 0.000 609.000 
Transaction value 38,497 3.150 0.069 12.503 0.000 243.279 
Market value assets 31,167 163.478 34.476 308.440 0.000 3,394.906 
Adjusted acquisition activity 30,704 0.020 0.005 0.049 0.000 0.360 
Top20_Wave 30,704 0.097 0.000 0.296 0.000 1.000 
STD_Wave 30,704 0.108 0.000 0.310 0.000 1.000 
Percent supplied 38,852 0.104 0.080 0.073 0.050 0.731 
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Table 2: Industry & Customers merger descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Industry descriptive statistics  
Table contains descriptive statistics for the industries in the Industry & Customers sample. Horizontal 
mergers is the number of horizontal mergers in an industry year. Transaction value is the sum of 
transaction values of all mergers in the industry in the year in billions of 2008 dollars. Market value assets 
is the total market value of assets in the industry at fiscal yearend in billions of 2008 dollars. Adjusted 
acquisition activity is the total transaction value of all deals in the industry in the year divided by the sum 
of industry total market value of assets. Top20_Wave (STD_Wave) is equal to one if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave (STD_Wave) and zero otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined 
in Figure 2. Adjusted acquisition activity is Winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
  Num Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Horizontal mergers 34,260 3.652 0.000 15.942 0.000 609.000 
Transaction value 34,260 0.444 0.000 3.838 0.000 243.279 
Market value assets 34,260 24.378 2.293 130.737 0.000 3,155.370 
Adjusted acquisition activity 34,260 0.037 0.000 0.187 0.000 1.600 
Top20_Wave 34,260 0.044 0.000 0.205 0.000 1.000 
STD_Wave 34,260 0.070 0.000 0.256 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Related customer descriptive statistics  
Table contains descriptive statistics for the related customers in the Industry & Customers sample. 
Percent purchased is the percent of industry outputs purchased by the customer industry. All other 
variables are as defined in Panel A.  
 
  Num Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Horizontal merger 32,058 17.096 2.000 40.643 0.000 609.000 
Transaction value 32,058 2.654 0.036 13.149 0.000 243.279 
Market value assets 30,344 120.921 18.639 314.568 0.000 3,394.906 
Adjusted acquisition activity 29,952 0.026 0.003 0.078 0.000 0.575 
Top20_Wave 29,952 0.098 0.000 0.297 0.000 1.000 
STD_Wave 29,952 0.100 0.000 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Percent consumed 34,260 0.091 0.059 0.100 0.030 1.000 
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Table 3: Control variables descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Control variables listed and described 
Table contains the expected sign, definition, sources and references for the control variables used in the 
logistic regression equations. 
 
Variable name 
(Expected Sign) 
Definition (Sources) References 
Spread (-) The average of the commercial and industrial loan rate 
minus the federal funds rate measured at December t= 
0 and t= -1. (Federal Reserve) 
 
Harford (2005), Lown 
et al. (2002) 
Deregulation (+) Dummy variable equal to one if the industry 
underwent deregulation in year t= 0. (Viscusi et al., 
2000; Economic Reports to the President) 
 
Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996), Andrade et al. 
(2005) 
Herfindahl (-)  Industry sum of squared market shares measured as of 
yearend t= 0. (Compustat) 
Becker and Thomas 
(2011), Curry and 
George (1983) 
Principal component 
(+) 
First principal component of the industry median 
value of the one year absolute change in profitability, 
asset turnover, capital expenditures, employee growth, 
ROA and sales growth. (Compustat) 
Harford (2005) 
Industry cash (+) Industry cash divided by book value of industry 
assets, year t=0. (Compustat) 
Jensen (1986) 
S&P one year return 
(+) 
Return on the S&P500, measured from end of year t=-
1 to t=0 (yahoo.finance.com) 
Ahern and Harford 
(2011), Maksimovic et 
al. (2010) 
 
Panel B: Industry & Suppliers control variables descriptive statistics  
Table contains descriptive statistics for the industries in the Industry & Suppliers sample. The variables 
are defined in Panel A. Herfindahl and industry cash are Winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
  Num. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Spreadt=-1,0 38,852 2.064 2.050 0.596 0.300 4.170 
Deregulationt=0 38,852 0.004 0.000 0.061 0.000 1.000 
Herfindahlt=0 38,852 0.466 0.406 0.300 0.016 1.000 
Principal componentt=0 35,075 0.027 0.078 1.512 -5.556 5.196 
Industry casht=0 38,852 0.052 0.031 0.059 0.000 0.309 
S&P one year return t=-1 to t=0 38,852 0.092 0.124 0.170 -0.385 0.341 
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Panel C: Industry & Customers control variables descriptive statistics 
Table contains descriptive statistics for the industries in the Industry & Customers sample. Variable 
definitions are given in Panel A. Herfindahl and industry cash are Winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
  Num. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Spreadt=-1,0 34,260 2.064 2.050 0.602 0.300 4.170 
Deregulationt=0 34,260 0.003 0.000 0.057 0.000 1.000 
Herfindahlt=0 34,260 0.495 0.440 0.305 0.023 1.000 
Principal componentt=0 30,816 0.026 0.081 1.587 -5.556 5.196 
Industry casht=0 34,260 0.051 0.031 0.055 0.000 0.283 
S&P one year return t=-1 to t=0 34,260 0.093 0.124 0.170 -0.385 0.341 
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Table 4: Industry & Suppliers logistic regression results 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is the 
Industry & Suppliers sample for years 1980-2008, although the first and last years are lost due to data 
leads and lags. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1), (2), and (3) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
in specifications (4), (5), and (6) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 
otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Supplier Top20_Wave and supplier 
STD_Wave are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that the wave is measured 
beginning in year t= -1 and refers to the supplier industry. Spread, deregulation, Herfindahl, principal 
component, industry cash and S&P one year return are defined in Table 3. Top supplier dummy is equal 
to one if the supplier industry provides the highest percent of inputs to the industry and 0 otherwise. 
Herfindahl is Winsorized at the 1% level. Robust p-values clustered at the industry level are in brackets. 
Odds ratios are in italics. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Industry Top20_Wavet=+1 Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-1 0.266** 0.213*
[0.026] [0.089]
1.305 1.238
Supplier STD_Wavet=-1 0.110 0.146*
[0.140] [0.078]
1.117 1.158
Top supplier dummy 0.010 -0.02
[0.892] [0.549]
1.010 0.980
Supplier wavet=-1 0.189 -0.173
   *(Top supplier dummy)a [0.406] [0.310]
1.208 0.841
Spreadt=-1,0 -0.358** -0.345** -0.347** -0.629*** -0.623*** -0.622***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.018] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.699 0.708 0.707 0.533 0.536 0.537
Deregulationt=0 0.749 0.756 0.759 0.864 0.857 0.861
[0.234] [0.228] [0.226] [0.130] [0.132] [0.130]
2.116 2.130 2.137 2.374 2.356 2.365
Herfindahlt=0 -3.065*** -3.044*** -3.044*** -1.019*** -1.018*** -1.020***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.047 0.048 0.048 0.361 0.361 0.361
Principal componentt=0 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.030 -0.030 -0.03
[0.975] [0.973] [0.972] [0.290] [0.301] [0.299]
1.001 1.001 1.001 0.970 0.971 0.971
Industry casht=0 2.009** 1.933** 1.939** 1.680** 1.659** 1.653**
[0.032] [0.039] [0.038] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022]
7.456 6.913 6.949 5.368 5.256 5.22
S&P one year returnt =-1 to t=0 0.612* 0.618* 0.616* 0.340 0.324 0.324
[0.056] [0.054] [0.055] [0.239] [0.260] [0.261]
1.843 1.855 1.852 1.405 1.383 1.383
Constant -1.173*** -1.231*** -1.230*** -0.839*** -0.860*** -0.856***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
Observations 26,298 26,298 26,298 26,298 26,298 26,298
Chi Squared Statistic 112.50 114.50 118.10 72.21 74.81 76.69
(a) p-value for joint significance with Supplier Wavet=-1 is 0.065 for regression (3) and 0.861 for regression (6)
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Table 5: Industry & Suppliers evidence of market power motivations 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for 
the Industry & Suppliers sample for years 1980-2008, although the first and last year are lost due to data 
leads and lags. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) and (2) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
in specifications (3) and (4) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 
otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Supplier Top20_Wave and supplier 
STD_Wave are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that they are measured at year 
t= -1 and refer to the supplier industry. Control variables are the same as in Table 4 but are omitted to 
conserve space. Supplier high profit is a dummy variable equal to one if the supplier’s operating profits in 
year t= 0 were greater than the median for that industry for the entire sample period. Supplier high change 
in Herfindahl is a dummy variable equal to one if the supplier change in Herfindahl from year t= -2 to 
year t= 0 was greater than the median for all supplier industries and 0 otherwise. Herfindahl is Winsorized 
at the 1% level. Robust p-values clustered at the industry level are in brackets. Odds ratios are in italics. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1 Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-1 0.286** 0.255*
[0.014] [0.087]
1.331 1.291
Supplier STD_Wavet=-1 0.113 -0.064
[0.140] [0.623]
1.119 0.938
Supplier high profit dummy 0.064 0.091*
[0.224] [0.062]
1.066 1.096
Supplier Wavet=-1 -0.032 -0.053
   *(Supplier high profit)a [0.849] [0.280]
0.968 0.949
Supplier high change in Herfindahl dummy 0.161*** 0.122**
[0.004] [0.020]
1.174 1.129
Supplier Wavet=-1 -0.004 0.211
   *(Supplier high change in Herfindahl)b [0.980] [0.180]
0.996 1.235
Observations 26,271 26,298 26,206 26,298
Chi Squared Statistic 117.00 119.40 77.96 82.78
a P-value for joint significance with supplier Top20_Wave is 0.141 and with supplier STD_Wave is 0.538
b P-value for joint significance with supplier Top20_Wave is 0.068 and with supplier STD_Wave is 0.095
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Table 6: Industry & Suppliers industry characteristic considerations 
Table contains selected results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for the Industry & Suppliers sample 
for years 1980-2008, although the first and last year are lost due to data leads and lags. The table presents coefficients for the regression variables 
specified, with significance indicated with symbols. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) through (4) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (5) through (8) if the 
industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Supplier 
Top20_Wave and supplier STD_Wave are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that they are measured beginning in year t= -1 
and refer to the supplier industry. Non-consumer goods is a dummy equal to one if the industry is not a maker of consumer durable or consumer 
non-durable goods. Low ads spending is a dummy variable equal to one if advertising expenditures divided by sales is less than the sample 
median. Low R&D spending is a dummy variable equal to one if R&D expenses divided by sales is less than the sample median. Low industry 
unionization is a dummy variable equal to one if the unionization rate for the industry year is less than the sample median (14.5%). The interaction 
variable is the supplier wave variable times the respective industry dummy. Joint supp wave and interaction is the sum of supplier wave and 
interaction coefficients and significance is based on a test of joint significance for the supplier wave and interaction variable. Control variables are 
the same as those used in the regression equations presented in Table 4 and the results are omitted to conserve space. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1  Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-1 0.009 0.259 0.140 0.181
Supplier STD_Wavet=-1 0.102 -0.010 0.176 0.004
Non-consumer goods -0.040 0.016
Low Ads spending 0.060 0.071
Low R&D spending 0.610*** 0.179**
Low Industry Unionization 0.341*** -0.045
Interaction 0.274 0.007 0.103 0.082 0.116 0.207 -0.116 0.188
Joint supp wave and interaction 0.283** 0.266* 0.245 0.262* 0.218** 0.197** 0.059 0.192*
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Table 7: Industry & Suppliers timing of merger waves 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for the industry-matched supplier sample for 
years 1980-2008. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) through (5) if the industry experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in 
year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (6) through (10) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave 
beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Supplier Top20_Wave and supplier STD_Wave 
are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that they refer to the supplier industry. Supplier merger wave starts are measured at 
year t= -3 for specifications (1) and (6), t= -2 for specifications (2) and (7), t= -1 for specifications (3) and (8), t= 0 for specifications (4) and (9) 
and t= +1 for specifications (5) and (10). Control variables are the same as in Table 4 but are omitted to conserve space. Robust p-values clustered 
at the industry level are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1  Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-3 0.154 Supplier STD_Wavet=-3 -0.036
[0.198] [0.664]
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-2 0.080 Supplier STD_Wavet=-2 0.147**
[0.483] [0.044]
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-1 0.266** Supplier STD_Wavet=-1 0.110
[0.026] [0.140]
Supplier Top20_Wavet=-0 0.079 Supplier STD_Wavet=0 0.169**
[0.500] [0.021]
Supplier Top20_Wavet=+1 -0.016 Supplier STD_Wavet=+1 0.017
[0.886] [0.821]
Observations 25,199 26,210 26,298 26,393 26,295 Observations 31,930 33,146 26,298 26,393 33,146
Chi Squared Statistic 110.39 112.90 114.53 112.52 112.82 Chi Squared Statistic 66.38 75.14 74.81 78.62 73.32
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Table 8: Industry & Customers logistic regression results 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is the 
Industry & Customers sample for years 1980-2008, although the first and last years are lost due to data 
leads and lags. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1), (2), and (3) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
in specifications (4), (5), and (6) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 
otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Customer Top20_Wave and customer 
STD_Wave are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that the wave is measured 
beginning in year t= -1 and refers to the customer industry. Spread, deregulation, Herfindahl, principal 
component, industry cash and S&P one year return are defined in Table 3. Top customer dummy is equal 
to one if the customer is the industry’s most important customer in terms of percent of output purchased 
and 0 otherwise. Herfindahl is Winsorized at the 1% level. Robust p-values clustered at the industry level 
are in brackets. Odds ratios are in italics. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. 
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Industry Top20_Wavet=+1 Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Top20_Wavet=-1 0.064 0.035
[0.570] [0.806]
1.067 1.035
Customer Top20_Wavet=-1 0.292*** 0.290***
[0.000] [0.001]
1.339 1.336
Top customer dummy 0.075 0.053
[0.428] [0.216]
1.078 1.054
Customer Wavet=-1 0.083 0.007
   *(Top customer dummy)a [0.716] [0.959]
1.087 1.007
Spreadt=-1,0 -0.407** -0.405** -0.406** -0.619*** -0.612*** -0.612***
[0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.666 0.667 0.666 0.538 0.542 0.542
Deregulationt=0 0.281 0.279 0.278 -0.044 -0.044 -0.046
[0.696] [0.697] [0.700] [0.945] [0.945] [0.943]
1.325 1.322 1.320 0.957 0.957 0.955
Herfindahlt=0 -2.865*** -2.862*** -2.852*** -1.058*** -1.055*** -1.050***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.057 0.057 0.058 0.347 0.348 0.350
Principal componentt=0 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020
[0.807] [0.812] [0.812] [0.535] [0.563] [0.563]
0.989 0.990 0.990 0.979 0.981 0.981
Industry casht=0 2.294 2.279 2.297 1.313 1.250 1.259
[0.120] [0.124] [0.119] [0.181] [0.204] [0.200]
9.915 9.770 9.939 3.716 3.491 3.522
S&P one year returnt =-1 to t=0 0.576 0.574 0.574 0.664* 0.642* 0.643*
[0.197] [0.200] [0.199] [0.066] [0.073] [0.073]
1.780 1.775 1.775 1.943 1.901 1.902
Constant -1.237** -1.250** -1.270** -0.907** -0.951** -0.966***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.009]
Observations 25,713 25,713 25,713 25,713 25,713 25,713
Chi Squared Statistic 77.73 78.13 81.34 53.67 64.36 69.21
(a) p-value for joint significance with Supplier Wavet=-1 is 0.518 for regression (3) and 0.025 for regression (6)
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Table 9: Industry & Customers evidence of market power motivations 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for 
the industry-matched customer sample for years 1980-2008, although the first and last year are lost due to 
data leads and lags. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) and (2) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
in specifications (3) and (4) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 
otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Customer Top20_Wave and customer 
STD_Wave are defined similarly to wave except that they are measured at year t= -1 and refer to the 
customer industry. Control variables are the same as in Table 8 but are omitted to conserve space. 
Customer high profit is a dummy variable equal to one if the customer’s operating profits in year t= 0 
were greater than the median for that industry for the entire sample period. Customer high change in 
Herfindahl is a dummy variable equal to one if the customer change in Herfindahl from year t= -2 to year 
t= 0 was greater than the median for all customer industries and 0 otherwise. Herfindahl is Winsorized at 
the 1% level. Robust p-values clustered at the industry level are in brackets. Odds ratios are in italics. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1 Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Top20_Wavet=-1 0.255** 0.131
[0.049] [0.344]
1.290 1.139
Customer STD_Wavet=-1 0.291*** 0.213*
[0.000] [0.067]
1.338 1.237
Customer high profit dummy 0.045 0.058
[0.453] [0.310]
1.046 1.060
Customer Wavet=-1 -0.378** 0.099
   *(Customer high profit)a [0.015] [0.315]
0.685 1.104
Customer high change in Herfindahl dummy 0.065 -0.006
[0.308] [0.906]
1.067 0.994
Customer Wavet=-1 -0.127 0.123
   *(Customer high change in Herfindahl)b [0.493] [0.359]
0.881 1.131
Observations 25,690 25,713 25,690 25,713
Chi Squared Statistic 82.47 80.05 69.56 66.04
a P-value for joint significance with supplier Top20_Wave is 0.400 and with supplier STD_wave is 0.001
b P-value for joint significance with supplier Top20_Wave is 0.980 and with supplier STD_Wave is 0.000
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Table 10: Industry & Customers industry characteristic considerations 
Table contains selected results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for the Industry & Customers sample 
for years 1980-2008, although the first and last year are lost due to data leads and lags. The table presents coefficients for the regression variables 
specified, with significance indicated with symbols. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) through (4) if the industry 
experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (5) through (8) if the 
industry experienced a STD_Wave beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Customer 
Top20_Wave and customer STD_Wave are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that they are measured beginning in year t= 
-1 and refer to the customer industry. Non-consumer goods is a dummy equal to one if the industry the industry is not a maker of consumer 
durable or non-durable goods. Low ads spending is a dummy variable equal to one if industry advertising expenditures divided by sales is less than 
the sample median. Low R&D spending is a dummy variable equal to one if industry R&D expenses divided by sales is less than the sample 
median. Low industry unionization is a dummy variable equal to one if the unionization rate for the industry year is less than the sample median 
(14.5%). The interaction variable is the customer wave variable times the respective industry dummy. Joint cust wave and interaction is the sum of 
customer wave and interaction coefficients and significance is based on a test of joint significance for the customer wave and interaction variable. 
Control variables are the same as those used in the regression equations presented in Table 8 and the results are omitted to conserve space. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1 Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)
Customer Top20_Wavet=-1 -0.301 -0.079 0.075 0.044
Customer STD_Wavet=-1 -0.076 0.303*** 0.222** 0.216**
Non-consumer goods 0.073 -0.043
Low Ads spending 0.009 -0.027
Low R&D spending 0.768*** 0.116
Low Industry Unionization 0.232 -0.092
Interaction 0.394 0.302 -0.083 0.009 0.410 -0.022 0.124 0.152
Joint cust wave and interaction 0.093 0.224 -0.008 0.052 0.334*** 0.282** 0.346*** 0.368***
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Table 11: Industry & Customers timing of merger waves 
Table contains results for logistic regression models estimated for merger wave starts. The sample is for the industry-matched customer sample for 
years 1980-2008. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (1) through (5) if the industry experienced a Top20_Wave beginning in 
year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in specifications (6) through (10) if the industry experienced a STD_Wave 
beginning in year t= +1 and 0 otherwise. Top20_Wave and STD_Wave are defined in Figure 2. Customer Top20_Wave and customer STD_Wave 
are defined similarly to Top20_Wave and STD_Wave except that they refer to the customer industry. Customer merger wave starts are measured 
at year t= -3 for specifications (1) and (6), t= -2 for specifications (2) and (7), t= -1 for specifications (3) and (8), t= 0 for specifications (4) and (9) 
and t= +1 for specifications (5) and (10). Control variables are the same as in Table 8 but are omitted to conserve space. Robust p-values clustered 
at the industry level are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
Industry Top20_Wavet=+1  Industry STD_Wavet=+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Customer Top20_Wavet=-3 0.154 Customer STD_Wavet=-3 0.039
[0.129] [0.639]
Customer Top20_Wavet=-2 0.140 Customer STD_Wavet=-2 0.058
[0.163] [0.460]
Customer Top20_Wavet=-1 0.064 Customer STD_Wavet=-1 0.292***
[0.570] [0.000]
Customer Top20_Wavet=0 0.112 Customer STD_Wavet=0 0.036
[0.270] [0.649]
Customer Top20_Wavet=+1 0.071 Customer STD_Wavet=+1 0.174**
[0.479] [0.014]
Observations 24,629 25,614 25,713 25,852 25,710 Observations 24,629 25,614 25,713 25,852 27,512
Chi Squared Statistic 88.15 81.59 78.13 79.22 79.16 Chi Squared Statistic 43.92 55.33 64.36 54.28 67.55
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Table 12: Supplier-top customer sample description of relationships and the frequency that 
certain industries are identified as top customers  
We use the benchmark input-output tables published in 1992 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the 
U.S. Department of Commerce to identify industries with significant vertical relationships.  Panel A lists 
the ten relationships where the identified top customer industries purchase the largest percentage of 
supplier industry output.  Panel B provides summary statistics on the percentage of supplier output that is 
purchased by the top customer and by the top four customer industries, respectively.  Panel C reports the 
number of relationship years (N = 11,713) for which the named industry is identified as the top customer. 
Panel A: Relationship description 
Supplier description Top customer description Percent purchased 
Maintenance and repair of petrol. and nat. gas wells Crude petroleum and natural gas 100.0% 
Electrometallurgical products, except steel Blast furnaces and steel mills 100.0% 
Fine earthenware table and kitchenware Eating and drinking places 100.0% 
Sugar crops Sugar 95.6% 
Malt Malt beverages 93.8% 
Iron and ferroalloy ores and misc. metal ores, n.e.c. Blast furnaces and steel mills 89.1% 
Wood television and radio cabinets Household audio and video equip. 88.0% 
Fasteners, buttons, needles, and pins Apparel made from purchased material 77.8% 
Poultry and eggs Poultry slaughtering and processing 76.9% 
Steel springs, except wire Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies 76.8% 
   
Panel B: Percentage of supplier output purchased by top customers 
  Relationships Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Percent purchased by top customer 419 19.9% 12.5% 20.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
Percent purchased by top 4 customers 419 34.6% 27.4% 27.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
       
Panel C: Frequency named industry is identified as the top customer 
Top customer industry  
Number of relationship-
years named as top customer 
Fraction of all relationship-
years named as top customer 
Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies  1,231 10.5% 
Eating and drinking places 1,223 10.4% 
Maintenance and repair of farm and 
nonfarm residential structures 944 8.1% 
Wholesale trade 909 7.8% 
Retail trade, except eating and drinking 486 4.2% 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories 305 2.6% 
Blast furnaces and steel mills  299 2.6% 
Aircraft 277 2.4% 
Apparel made from purchased materials  210 1.8% 
Miscellaneous repair shops 182 1.6% 
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Table 13: Customer-top supplier sample description of relationships and the frequency 
that certain industries are identified as top suppliers  
We use the benchmark input-output tables published in 1992 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the 
U.S. Department of Commerce to identify industries with significant vertical relationships.  Panel A lists 
the ten relationships where the identified top supplier industries supply the largest percentage of customer 
industry inputs.  Panel B provides summary statistics on the percentage of customer inputs that are 
supplied by the top supplier and by the top four supplier industries, respectively.  Panel C reports the 
number of relationship years (N = 11,744) for which the named industry is identified as the top supplier. 
Panel A: Relationship description 
Customer description Top supplier description Percent supplied 
Meat packing plants Meat animals 79.1% 
Soybean oil mills Oil bearing crops 61.6% 
Petroleum refining Crude petroleum and natural gas 56.6% 
Creamery butter Fluid milk 51.3% 
Fluid milk Dairy farm products 51.0% 
Poultry slaughtering and processing Poultry and eggs 48.4% 
Malt Feed grains 47.2% 
Sausages and other prepared meat products Meat packing plants 47.0% 
Cottonseed oil mills Cotton 46.2% 
Poultry and eggs Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 42.1% 
   
Panel B: Percentage of customer inputs supplied by top suppliers 
  Relationships Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. Min. Max. 
Percent supplied by top supplier 421 12.4% 8.6% 10.6% 0.6% 79.1% 
Percent supplied by top 4 suppliers 421 25.8% 22.4% 13.3% 3.4% 84.8% 
       
Panel C: Frequency named industry is identified as the top supplier 
Top supplier industry  
Number of relationship-
years named as top 
supplier 
Fraction of all 
relationship-years named 
as top supplier 
Wholesale trade 2,647 22.5% 
Blast furnaces and steel mills 868 7.4% 
Paper and paperboard mills 466 4.0% 
Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c. 450 3.8% 
Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals 434 3.7% 
Petroleum refining 394 3.4% 
Broadwoven fabric mills and fabric finishing 381 3.2% 
Other electronic components 337 2.9% 
Trucking and courier services, except air 327 2.8% 
Sawmills and planing mills, general 278 2.4% 
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Table 14: Supplier-top customer descriptive statistics 
The statistics below are reported by supplier - top customer relationship year.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of the 
industry’s total sales.  Thus, for industry i in year t, HHI is measured as HHIit=
2
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jitjit SALESSALES , where Nit is the number of segments in industry i at time t 
and Salesjit are the net sales attributable to segment j of industry i at time t.  Changes in HHI are 
calculated as the ratio of HHI at one point in time over HHI at another point in time minus one, e.g., the 
one year ahead change in HHI is calculated as (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1.  Industry sales are reported in billions 
of 2008 dollars.  Changes in HHI and industry sales are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
 
    
Rel. 
years Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Supplier       
 Number of segments per industry 11,713 19.629 6.000 53.411 1.000 1,200.000 
 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt=0) 11,713 4,583.8 3,848.9 3,029.5 137.9 10,000.0 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 10,304 0.124 0.030 0.400 -0.583 1.644 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 10,745 0.084 0.010 0.322 -0.546 1.317 
 1-year change HHI, (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 11,204 0.043 0.000 0.226 -0.471 0.974 
 Industry sales 11,713 15.610 2.779 47.038 0.005 366.422 
        
Top Customer       
 Number of segments per industry 11,713 100.548 38.000 141.432 1.000 1,200.000 
 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt=0) 11,713 2,231.2 1,230.2 2,287.2 137.9 10,000.0 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 10,493 0.094 0.039 0.324 -0.496 1.307 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 10,899 0.064 0.024 0.257 -0.460 1.107 
 1-year change HHI ,(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 11,297 0.032 0.004 0.169 -0.378 0.713 
 1-year change HHI, (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 11,329 0.032 0.004 0.168 -0.377 0.713 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 10,954 0.063 0.024 0.254 -0.460 1.073 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 10,233 0.093 0.039 0.323 -0.491 1.303 
  Industry sales 11,713 158.089 60.619 249.072 0.026 1,407.643 
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Table 15: Summary statistics for variables in multivariate regressions explaining changes 
in supplier concentration 
This table reports summary statistics for the independent variables in multivariate regressions explaining 
changes in supplier concentration over the period from t=0 to t=+3.  To be included in this regression the 
relationship pair must have change in HHI data available for the period t=0 to t=+3 for the suppliers and 
for the period t=-3 to t=0 for the top customers.  Panel A reports summary statistics for factors specific to 
the individual supplier industries.  Sales growth is the change in inflation adjusted total industry sales 
from t=-2 to t=0.   The deregulation dummy is equal to one if the supplier industry experienced 
deregulation in t=0 or t=-1.  Import market share is the customs value (in dollars) of products imported 
into the US with the same IO code as the supplier industry divided by the supplier industry’s total sales at 
t = 0, where import data are missing for a particular industry this variable is set to zero.  Missing imports 
flag is a dummy variable equal to one if the import data are missing for a particular industry.  Advertising 
to sales is the industry median advertising to sales ratio at t=0.  The first principal component is first 
principal component of the absolute value of the two year change (from t=-2 to t=0) of the following 
supplier ratios: asset turnover (total sales/assets), earning power (operating income/assets), profit margin 
(operating income/sales), and capital expenditures (capital expenditures/assets).  The statistic is calculated 
as the median value for all the segments in the industry.  The first principal component is set equal to zero 
if data required to calculate it are missing.  The missing principal component flag is equal to one if the 
first principal component was missing.  Panel B reports summary statistics for macroeconomic variables.  
Spread is the commercial and industrial loan rate spread above the Federal funds rate as of December t=0.  
The S&P 500 2-year return is the 2-year compounded annual return on the S&P 500 for the period ending 
at t=0.   
 
Panel A: Supplier industry variables 
  
Rel. 
years Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Sales growth  8,983 0.269 0.035 1.343 -0.936 10.360 
Deregulation dummy 9,127 0.005 0.000 0.068 0.000 1.000 
Import market share 9,127 1.316 0.134 5.478 0.000 51.999 
Missing imports flag 9,127 0.218 0.000 0.413 0.000 1.000 
Advertising to sales 9,127 0.022 0.010 0.038 0.000 0.226 
First principal component 9,127 -0.014 -0.177 0.857 -0.865 21.029 
Missing principal components flag 9,127 0.044 0.000 0.206 0.000 1.000 
 
      
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables 
  
Rel. 
years Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Spread 27 2.017 2.000 0.607 0.297 4.173 
S&P 2-year return 27 0.233 0.189 0.235 -0.334 0.659 
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Table 16: Multivariate regressions explaining changes in supplier concentration from t=0 
to t=+3 
This table reports regression results explaining changes in supplier concentration over the period from t=0 
to t=+3.  To be included in this regression the relationship pair must have change in HHI data available 
for the period t=0 to t=+3 for the suppliers and for the period t=-3 to t=0 for the top customers.  Supplier 
HHIt=0 is the supplier industry HHI at t=0.  Supplier industry sales is the net inflation adjusted sales 
volume for the supplier industry as of t=0.  Supplier sales growth is the change in inflation adjusted total 
industry sales from t=-2 to t=0.  The deregulation dummy is equal to one if the supplier industry 
experienced deregulation in t = 0 or -1.  Import market share is the customs value (in dollars) of products 
imported into the US with the same IO code as the supplier industry divided by the supplier industry’s 
total sales at t = 0, where import data are missing for a particular industry this variable is set to zero.  
Missing imports flag is a dummy variable equal to one if the import data are missing for a particular 
industry.  Advertising to sales is the industry median advertising to sales ratio at t=0.  The first principal 
component is first principal component of the absolute value of the two year change (from t=-2 to t=0) of 
the following supplier ratios: asset turnover (total sales/assets), earning power (operating income/assets), 
profit margin (operating income/sales), and capital expenditures (capital expenditures/assets).  The first 
principal component is set equal to zero if data required to calculate it are missing.  The missing principal 
component flag is equal to one if the first principal component was missing.  Spread is the commercial 
and industrial loan rate spread above the Federal funds rate as of December t=0. The S&P 500 2-year 
return is the 2-year compounded annual return on the S&P 500 for the period ending at t=0.  Reported p-
values are based on White standard errors clustered by supplier industry.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
 
 Coefficient p-value 
Top customer HHI change, (HHIt=0/HHIt=-3) -1 0.035** [0.039] 
Supplier HHIt=0 -0.000*** [0.000] 
Supplier industry sales -0.767*** [0.000] 
Supplier sales growth 0.000 [0.928] 
Deregulation dummy -0.075 [0.279] 
Import market share 0.002** [0.029] 
Missing imports flag -0.051*** [0.001] 
Advertising to sales -0.231* [0.089] 
First principal component 0.015*** [0.004] 
Missing principal component flag 0.018 [0.386] 
Spread -0.025*** [0.007] 
S&P 2-year return 0.033 [0.145] 
Constant 0.379*** [0.000] 
   
Observations 8,983  
Adjusted R-squared 0.083  
F-statistic 36.58  
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Table 17: Multivariate regressions explaining changes in supplier concentration 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
supplier industry HHI over the indicated time window and the independent variable of interest is the 
change in top customer industry HHI over the indicated time window.  The coefficients on the change in 
top customer industry HHI over the indicated time windows are reported along with their p-values in 
brackets and the number of relationship years included in the particular regression specification in italics.  
Additional control variables as identified in Table 16 are also included in each specification but results for 
these additional variables are not reported to conserve space.  Reported p-values are based on White 
standard errors clustered by supplier industry.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level, respectively. 
 
  Supplier 
Top customer (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 0.035** 0.026** 0.014** 
 [0.039] [0.024] [0.025] 
 8,983 9,385 9,811 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 0.027 0.028* 0.012 
 [0.135] [0.052] [0.149] 
 9,380 9,784 10,212 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 0.044* 0.034* 0.010 
 [0.052] [0.070] [0.488] 
 9,368 9,772 10,200 
    
(HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 0.042* 0.022 0.005 
 [0.061] [0.245] [0.721] 
 9,348 9,752 10,180 
    
(HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 0.042** 0.028*  
 [0.029] [0.062]  
 9,340 9,744  
    
(HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 0.036**   
 [0.029]   
  9,324   
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Table 18: Multivariate regressions explaining changes in supplier concentration using 
changes in top customer concentration when top customers are assigned randomly 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
supplier industry HHI over the indicated time window and the independent variable of interest is the 
change in top customer industry HHI over the indicated time window.  The change in top customer HHI 
is for a randomly assigned top customer industry.  For each time window considered, we construct 1,000 
samples where the customer industries are assigned randomly (with replacement) to the supplier 
industries.  The reported coefficients are the average coefficients obtained from the 1,000 regressions run 
on these samples.  The frequency that the coefficient on the change in random top customer HHI is 
significant at the 5% level in the 1,000 individual regressions is reported in the second row.  * denotes 
that the observed frequency of significant coefficients on the random top customer change in HHI is 
significantly greater than 0.05 at the 5% level using a one sided binomial test.  Additional control 
variables as identified in Table 16 are also included in each specification but results for these additional 
variables are not reported to conserve space. 
   
 Supplier 
Top customer (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 0.004 0.005 0.003 
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.050 0.076* 0.087* 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 0.006 0.006 0.004 
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.057 0.067* 0.072* 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 0.008 0.007 0.004 
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.074* 0.075* 0.048 
    
(HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 0.009 0.007 0.004 
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.077* 0.074* 0.046 
    
(HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 0.010 0.007  
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.092* 0.079*  
    
(HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 0.011   
Frequency significant at 5% level 0.094*   
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Table 19: Multivariate regressions explaining changes in supplier concentration when top 
customer industries consolidate  
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
supplier industry HHI over the indicated time window and the independent variables are: the change in 
top customer industry HHI over the indicated time window; a term interacting the change in top customer 
HHI and a dummy variable that is equal to one if the change in top customer HHI is positive; and the 
additional control variables identified in Table 16. The change in top customer HHI coefficient is 
presented in the top row, the coefficient on the interaction term is in the second row, and the third row 
presents the p-value, in brackets, from an F test that the sum of the coefficients on the change in top 
customer HHI and the interaction term is zero. Significance of the individual coefficients as well as the 
significance of the results of the F test is indicated.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level, respectively.   
 
  Supplier 
Top customer (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 0.107** 0.084** 0.061*** 
Interaction term -0.095* -0.076* -0.061*** 
 [0.577] [0.591] [0.996] 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 0.118** 0.101*** 0.047** 
Interaction term -0.122** -0.099** -0.047* 
 [0.872] [0.893] [0.992] 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 0.107* 0.039 0.041 
Interaction term -0.089 -0.008 -0.045 
 [0.596] [0.226] [0.836] 
    
(HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 0.040 0.039 -0.028 
Interaction term 0.003 -0.025 0.046 
 [0.201] [0.606] [0.311] 
    
(HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 0.055 0.006  
Interaction term -0.018 0.030  
 [0.147] [0.083*]  
    
(HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 0.051   
Interaction term -0.019   
 [0.140]   
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Table 20: Multivariate logistic regressions explaining large increases in supplier 
concentration 
This table presents the results of multivariate logistic regressions where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the change in supplier industry HHI over the indicated time 
window is above the 75th percentile and a zero otherwise.  The independent variable of interest is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the change in top customer industry HHI over the indicated 
time window is above the 75th percentile and zero otherwise.  The coefficients on the change in top 
customer industry HHI dummy variables over the indicated time windows are reported along with their p-
values in brackets and the number of relationship years included in the particular regression specification 
in italics.  Additional control variables as identified in Table 16 are also included in each specification but 
results for these additional variables are not reported to conserve space.  Reported p-values are based on 
White standard errors clustered by supplier industry.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
  Supplier 
Top customer (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 -0.036 -0.006 0.054 
 [0.632] [0.926] [0.358] 
 8,983 9,385 9,811 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 -0.017 0.061 0.103* 
 [0.797] [0.357] [0.065] 
 9,380 9,784 10,212 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 0.044 0.070 0.023 
 [0.479] [0.234] [0.678] 
 9,368 9,772 10,200 
    
(HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 0.090 0.042 0.095* 
 [0.138] [0.464] [0.080] 
 9,348 9,752 10,180 
    
(HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 0.133** 0.062  
 [0.049] [0.310]  
 9,340 9,744  
    
(HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 0.131*   
 [0.059]   
  9,324   
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Table 21: Customer-top supplier sample descriptive statistics 
The statistics below are reported by customer – top supplier relationship year.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of the 
industry’s total sales.  Thus, for industry i in year t, HHI is measured as HHIit=
2
1 1
100*∑ ∑
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j
jitjit SALESSALES , where Nit is the number of segments in industry i at time t 
and Salesjit are the net sales attributable to segment j of industry i at time t.  Changes in HHI are 
calculated as the ratio of HHI at one point in time over HHI at another point in time minus one, e.g., the 
one year ahead change in HHI is calculated as (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1.  Industry sales are reported in billions 
of 2008 dollars.  Changes in HHI and industry sales are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
 
 
    
Rel. 
years Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. Min. Max. 
Customer       
 Number of segments per industry 11,744 20.056 6.000 53.662 1.000 1,200.000 
 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt=0) 11,744 4,557.6 3,804.8 3,043.6 137.9 10,000.0 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 10,325 0.124 0.030 0.399 -0.584 1.648 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 10,771 0.083 0.010 0.322 -0.549 1.323 
 1-year change HHI, (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 11,230 0.043 0.000 0.225 -0.472 0.974 
 Industry sales 11,744 15.714 2.785 46.872 0.004 366.422 
        
Top supplier       
 Number of segments per industry 11,744 
136.02
0 42.000 
182.18
8 1.000 1,200.000 
 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt=0) 11,744 1,985.9 925.2 2,369.6 137.9 10,000.0 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 10,511 0.122 0.042 0.393 -0.510 1.589 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 10,920 0.083 0.021 0.306 -0.471 1.264 
 1-year change HHI ,(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 11,328 0.041 0.005 0.198 -0.370 0.848 
 1-year change HHI, (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 11,362 0.041 0.005 0.198 -0.370 0.848 
 2-year change HHI, (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 10,977 0.084 0.021 0.306 -0.469 1.264 
 3-year change HHI, (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 10,253 0.122 0.042 0.395 -0.510 1.589 
  Industry sales 11,744 
157.95
8 46.373 
223.15
5 0.019 856.547 
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Table 22: Multivariate regressions explaining changes in customer concentration 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
customer industry HHI over the indicated time window and the independent variable of interest is the 
change in top supplier industry HHI over the indicated time window.  The coefficients on the change in 
top supplier industry HHI over the indicated time windows are reported along with their p-values in 
brackets and the number of relationship years included in the particular regression specification in italics.  
Additional control variables identified Table 16 (with appropriate changes so they reflect customer 
industry characteristics) are also included in each specification but results for these additional variables 
are not reported to conserve space.  Reported p-values are based on White standard errors clustered by 
customer industry.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
  Customer 
Top supplier (HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 (HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-3)-1 0.009 0.010 0.004 
 [0.516] [0.287] [0.542] 
 8,994 9,403 9,829 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-2)-1 0.012 0.017 0.012 
 [0.447] [0.177] [0.107] 
 9,390 9,801 10,229 
    
(HHIt=0/HHIt=-1)-1 0.014 0.023 0.003 
 [0.505] [0.162] [0.771] 
 9,385 9,796 10,224 
    
(HHIt=+1/HHIt=0)-1 0.017 0.004 0.002 
 [0.407] [0.807] [0.884] 
 9,363 9,773 10,202 
    
(HHIt=+2/HHIt=0)-1 0.019 0.012  
 [0.236] [0.316]  
 9,345 9,755  
    
(HHIt=+3/HHIt=0)-1 0.031**   
 [0.022]   
  9,330   
    
 
 
 
